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Property as a Management Institution
Lynda L. Butler†
INTRODUCTION
The institution of property serves an important
management function for society, guiding the use of resources
among its members by delegating to the owner the power to
decide how and when to use a resource. Under the dominant
American approach, this delegation recognizes broad decision-
making powers in the individual property owner. Grounded in
an exclusion-based view of property, the dominant approach
treats each property owner as a gatekeeper, with important in
rem rights that bind all others in the legal system, requiring
them to respect the property—even those not in a direct
relationship with the owner.1 Over time, courts and other
lawmakers have developed doctrines and rules to guide and
sometimes constrain the exercise of gatekeeping powers. For the
most part, these guiding legal principles address direct
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1 See JAMES E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 23 (1997). Leading
scholars who have promoted the exclusion-based view in recent years include Richard
Epstein, Tom Merrill, and Henry Smith. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity
and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 22 (1997);
Thomas W. Merrill, Essay, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730
(1998) [hereinafter Merrill, Right to Exclude I ] ; Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus
Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453,
S454–55 (2002) [hereinafter Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance]; see also Lynda L.
Butler, The Governance Function of Constitutional Property, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1687, 1692–93 (2015) [hereinafter Butler, Governance Function] (defining the exclusion
strategy); Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience of Property, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 847, 879 (2013)
[hereinafter Butler, Resilience of Property] (explaining the mainstream economic
justification for the exclusion-based view); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right
to Exclude II, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 1 (2014) [hereinafter Merrill,
Right to Exclude II] (offering additional justification for the exclusion-based view).
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relationships that basic economic and fairness perspectives
suggest the property owner should consider in making decisions
about the property.2 Relationships between the property owner
and others having rights in the same property, between the
property owner and successors-in-interest, and, to a lesser
extent, between the property owner and close neighbors, raise
the types of issues addressed by the traditional doctrines and
rules. Topics of concern include tangible spillovers borne by
owners of neighboring property,3 cost problems affecting buyers
and sellers of real estate,4 and wasteful, unauthorized, or
excessive uses that affect other rights in the same resource.5
2 The do-no-harm principle, for example, defines the scope of ownership
rights in a way that considers the interests of neighboring landowners, forcing the
decision-maker to internalize foreseeable and tangible spillovers. This principle is at
the core of the nuisance doctrine. A landowner is liable for a nuisance if her conduct
would cause significant harm to a hypothetical “normal person in the community or by
property in normal condition and used for a normal purpose.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 821F (AM. LAW INST. 1979). This standard makes a particular neighbor’s
sensitivity to the spillovers from the landowner’s conduct irrelevant to the question of
liability. See id. § 821F cmt. d (explaining that unless the conduct would significantly
harm a normal person in the community, there is no liability for interference with the
use and enjoyment of a hypersensitive neighbor’s property, but there is liability if the
standard is met, even though the landowner’s particular neighbors are desensitized to,
and incur no harm from, the landowner’s conduct). By making liability for a nuisance
dependent on actual harm caused, the law incentivizes a landowner to consider ex ante
the consequences of her conduct on neighboring property.
3 Nuisance law, for example, governs unreasonable and substantial
interference with another’s use and enjoyment of her property. See id. §§ 821F, 822.
Under the Restatement approach, nuisance law focuses on the extent of the harm to
the use and enjoyment of property, rather than the conduct that caused such harm. Id.
§ 822 cmt. b. The Restatement requires that the gravity of the harm be balanced
against the utility of the conduct causing the harm, id. § 822 cmt. k, based on the
premise that there are costs to living in an organized society, which include putting up
with some amount of interference from others, id. § 822 cmt. g.
4 Laws governing real estate transactions have established certain default
rules that define the rights and obligations of sellers and purchasers of real estate. For
example, in states that have adopted the doctrine of equitable conversion, the purchaser
has equitable title and therefore assumes the risk of loss to the land in the period
between execution of the contract for sale and closing. 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equitable
Conversion § 13 (2016); 1 TIFFANY REAL PROP. §§ 309, 310a (3d ed. 2016); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 47 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2011). Today, sellers of real property
may also be required to disclose any defects of quality or title that a buyer could not learn
by inspecting the property. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 cmt. d
(AM. LAW INST. 1981); 4 TIFFANY REAL PROP. § 986.20 (3d ed. 2016). In addition, different
types of deeds provide varying levels of protection to the purchaser from present or future
claims. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY § 11.4.3 (4th ed. 2014) [hereinafter
SINGER, PROPERTY] (discussing the different types of deeds and their warranties of title).
And even when third-party interests encumber a seller’s land, the seller still may have
marketable title if the buyer had notice of the encumbrances or a reasonable buyer could
accept the title. Id. § 11.3.3.3, at 519–20, 522–23.
5 The doctrine of waste, for instance, restricts a tenant’s use of property to
protect the landlord’s reversionary interest. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.:
LANDLORD & TENANT § 12.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also id. § 12.2 cmt. c (“It must
not be lost sight of, however, that the landlord has a reversionary interest in the leased
property and that the physical changes in the leased property that are reasonably
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The dominant approach to the management function
works well much of the time. It is a low-cost approach that relies
on the incentives of the marketplace to reward the productive
gatekeeper or replace the wasteful one. With a simple delegation,
ownership rights and powers are placed in the gatekeeper and
protected from encroachment or interference through the power
to exclude.6 As long as the owner follows applicable rules and
regulations, decisions about the property generally will be good
against society at large.7
Perhaps because of how property is defined in terms of an
allocation of rights and interests in resources, the management
role of property has largely been ignored by scholars and jurists
adhering to the exclusion-based or mainstream economic theory of
property—except in the context of the owner’s narrow self-
interests.8 Defining property in terms of its allocation function
puts the emphasis on the individual right holder. Reliance on
the marketplace to effectuate the right holder’s decisions then
promotes efficiency as the guiding norm. The focus on the
individual gatekeeper and the economic incentives shaping her
decisions narrowly frames the management calculus, ignoring
collective or societal interests that also have shaped the operation
of our property system. Developed through our fundamental
political institutions, these collective interests provide an
important counterweight to the self-interests driving the
decisions of the individual gatekeeper.9 Thinking of property as a
management institution more broadly provides a different lens
necessary to enjoy those uses must be determined in the light of the eventual
resumption of possession by the landlord.”).
6 See Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 1, at 879–80; Larissa Katz, The
Regulative Function of Property Rights, 8 ECON J. WATCH 236, 239–40 (2011); Merrill,
Right to Exclude I, supra note 1, at 747–52; Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2063–71 (2012) [hereinafter Merrill, Property Strategy]; see also
Merrill, Right to Exclude II, supra note 1, at 21–25 (rebutting criticisms of the exclusion-
based view).
7 See Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 1, at 861–62; Merrill,
Property Strategy, supra note 6, at 2068–71; Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of
Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1702–08 (2012) [hereinafter Smith, Law of Things].
8 See, e.g., Merrill, Property Strategy, supra note 6, at 2063–71 (defining the
property strategy as placing decentralized control over a valuable, discrete resource in
an identifiable owner having the capacity to manage the resource and the right to
exclude others generally from capturing the value resulting from management); Smith,
Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1693–94, 1698–99, 1702–08 (developing a theory of
property that revolves around delineation of costs through the exclusion strategy as the
primary platform of property’s structure); see also infra notes 52–57 and accompanying
text (discussing how property law uses the exclusion strategy to promote the efficient
allocation of property rights).
9 Joe Singer, for example, maintains that the fundamental political values of
our democracy impose structural constraints on our property system. See Joseph
William Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1303–24 (2014)
[hereinafter Singer, Law of Democracy].
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for examining the exercise of property rights, revealing other
dimensions that are important to the survival of a property
system existing within a democratic society and a world of
finite resources.
One consequence of ignoring property’s management
function is that much of the infrastructure of property—that
part of property that makes it work—has been misunderstood.
As efforts to import Western property systems have
demonstrated, it is not enough to formally recognize private
property rights.10 In his intriguing book The Mystery of Capital,
Hernando de Soto proclaimed the “hour of capitalism’s greatest
triumph” to be “its hour of crisis.”11 He lamented the failure of
developing and transitioning countries to adopt successful
capitalist economies despite their recognition of capitalism as
the “only feasible way rationally to organize a modern
economy.”12 Instead of peace and posterity, their people have
faced “economic and political disaster”—rioting, looting, and
starvation.13 His book probed the reasons for this failure,
ultimately concluding that reform efforts have taken for granted
the way capital is produced, especially through the property
system. They have taken for granted the “legal infrastructure
hidden deep within their property systems . . . [O]wnership is
but the tip of the iceberg. The rest of the iceberg is an intricate
man-made process that can transform assets and labour into
capital”14 and promote social welfare. Successful reform efforts
must understand that process.
In recent years, the scholarship of Tom Merrill and
Henry Smith has done much to rediscover and understand the
forgotten structure of property—how it works, how it manages
10 E.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 1–13 (2000). Michael
Heller’s description of Russian kiosks provides a striking example. Michael A. Heller,
The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111
HARV. L. REV. 621, 622–24 (1998). In the late 1990s, the Russian government sought to
legitimize the transition away from communism by granting private property rights to
broad segments of political society. Id. at 637–38. Individual rights in the bundle of
rights that collectively constitute the ownership rights of a single owner in the West
were split up and distributed among several different economic actors. Id. The result
was a collective action problem that Heller called a “tragedy of the anticommons”—i.e.,
so many actors had the right to exclude with respect to any given resource that no one,
in effect, could make productive use of it. Id. at 623–24. In the case of storefronts on
Russian city streets, one entity may have had a right to determine what types of
businesses could use the space, while another had the right to lease it, and still another
had a right to collect on the occupants’ revenues, etc. Id. at 637–39, 638 fig.2. Vendors
could not collect all the necessary permissions to use the storefronts, so they sold their
wares from street-side kiosks, while the storefronts remained vacant. Id. at 622–23.
11 DE SOTO, supra note 10, at 1.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 2.
14 Id. at 8–9.
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resources and rights, how it regulates use.15 In a series of jointly
and individually authored pieces, they have identified key
concepts shaping the framework of property and have explained
how property’s conceptual framework delineates rights.16
Merrill, in particular, has developed an exclusion-based theory
of property and explained how exclusion works by supporting
both the “residual managerial authority”—the discretion to
make decisions about a resource—and the “residual accessionary
rights” of property—the right to capture changes in value as well
as emergent resources.17 Smith, in turn, described the structure
of property through the development of an information-cost
theory of property. He explained how property is organized
around “lumpy packages” or “modules” that regulate the flow of
information to promote efficient transactions and manage for
complexity.18 A complex system has “many interdependencies”
and can only function effectively when the flow of information is
controlled.19 A modular structure manages the flow of information
by walling off information irrelevant to a particular situation and
limiting interconnections between packages of property rights,
fostering standardization.20 Property’s modules thus minimize
the costs of interactions.21
Merrill’s and Smith’s works have greatly advanced
thinking about property as a complex system. Their scholarship,
however, focuses primarily on property as a source of individual
rights—as a way to optimally allocate those rights. Management,
15 See, e.g., Merrill, Property Strategy, supra note 6, at 2063–71 (describing the
basic elements of the strategy for regulating the use of things that underpins property
laws in most historical and contemporary human societies); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry
E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 9–23 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus]
(recognizing that under the common law, the set of possible arrangements of rights in an
item of property is limited to a certain number of standard forms and identifying those
forms); Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1700–16 (advancing a theory of property
under which the particular rights of owners in things are defined so as to minimize
information costs vis-à-vis third parties). Others have also contributed much to the
debate. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 6, at 240–44 (offering a unique approach to
understanding private property rights under which owners are given the exclusive right
to determine property’s use on behalf of the general public).
16 See sources cited supra note 15; see also Henry E. Smith, The Persistence of
System in Property Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2055 (2015) (maintaining that the basic
features of property law reflect its basic architecture as a system).
17 See Merrill, Property Strategy, supra note 6, at 2067–70; see also Merrill,
Right to Exclude I, supra note 1, at 740–45 (explaining that logically other property rights
may be derived by initially granting the owner the right to exclude, but not vice versa);
Merrill, Right to Exclude II, supra note 1, at 2–8 (defending his argument that the right
to exclude is a necessary precondition to other private property rights).
18 Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1693, 1716, 1725.
19 Id. at 1701.
20 See id. at 1701–02.
21 See id. at 1709–10.
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more often than not, is treated as a stepchild of the allocation
system, guided by the allocative norm of efficiency.22 Other values
and functions of property tend to be ignored. What embeds the
management function into the allocation system under their
approach is the very feature that makes our property system
work on its own much of the time: the exclusion-based theory of
property. What limits their approach is the assumed
subordination of the more outward-regarding governance strategy
for managing property.23
Though the exclusion strategy is a low-cost way to
manage a property system, it can lead to significant problems,
especially in transitioning countries with incomplete economies
and political structures. In certain situations, the exclusion-based
approach produces high transaction costs, fails to consider
existing third-party interests, and ignores the interests of future
generations.24 It also defines the scale of use too narrowly to allow
consideration of cumulative impact or diffused harm and thus
provide meaningful accountability.25
What is missing from the dominant model is a more
comprehensive management approach that not only takes care of
the individual owner, allowing him to reap the reasonable
rewards of his efforts, but also considers society (broadly defined)
and the larger natural system. What is missing is an outward-
22 See Merrill, Property Strategy, supra note 6, at 2068–69 (discussing
restrictions on a property owner as exceptions to the owner’s right to manage); Smith,
Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1709–10, 1718–20 (describing exclusion as property’s
decision-making platform and the governance strategy as an exception or limitation).
23 In one article, for example, Smith explains how the exclusion strategy
provides the platform—the everyday default rules—while the governance strategy
identifies when exceptions are needed to provide fairness in particular settings. Smith,
Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1705, 1710. Merrill also regards governance strategy
rules as exceptions to a fundamental right to exclude in the private property owner.
See, e.g., Merrill, Property Strategy, supra note 6, at 2068–69, 2069 n.24 (characterizing
statutory and common law restrictions on an owner’s use of property as “subtractions”
from the owner’s basic right to manage the property).
24 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
1853, 1876–82, 1887 (2012) (arguing that “[g]overnance property promotes human
flourishing in ways that exclusion property does not,” by protecting a sense of
community—for example, preventing a party from unilaterally exiting a tenancy by the
entirety, or sharing rights to possess, enjoy, or consume); Henry E. Smith, Governing
Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 458–60 (2008)
(arguing that an exclusion-based property view as applied to water may lead to misuse,
preventing use by other parties and protecting the owner’s decisions on how to or how not
to use his privileges); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1719, 1733, 1755–58 (2004) (contrasting exclusion-based and governance strategies under
a “transaction structure,” and their respective tradeoffs between marginal costs and
precision); see also Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-Dimensional Framework for Analyzing Property
Rights Regimes, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 813, 816–20, 830–32 (2003) (discussing Heller’s
tragedy of the anticommons as applied to global resources and climate change).
25 See infra notes 92–98 and accompanying text (discussing property’s
scale of use).
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regarding perspective that encompasses a broader sense of
responsibility for the impacts of property use on society and
nature, and that recognizes the role of collection action in
managing the exercise of property rights. In our democratic
system, collective management occurs through decision making
based on debate, rhetoric, persuasion, voting, and engagement
with interested parties. The individual rights focus of the
exclusion theory tends to ignore the relationship between
property owners and future generations, between property
owners and indiscriminate members of the public, and between
property owners and fundamental biophysical systems. Problems
arising from these interactions can be quite serious, involving
resource hoarding, excessive fragmentation of resources, and
serious, sometimes irreversible, degradation of the environment.26
Collective decision making brings in the relational dimensions of
property that would otherwise be ignored.
A property management system should be able to govern
the use of resources in ways that promote individual well-being,
social cohesion, and the integrity of political, economic, and
natural systems. A good theory frames what matters and is not
just reactive. It has predictive value and enables generalization.27
Our institution of property involves a continuum of possible
property arrangements, ranging from almost absolute private
property rights to government ownership of property.28 A
management system should offer tools for governing different
property arrangements, not just exclusion-based arrangements.
26 For further discussion of the limitations of the exclusionary approach to
property, see infra Section II.A.
27 See Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1695 (“A theoretical description
[of property] should have some predictive value in that it should correctly lead us to
expect certain property systems under a new set of conditions and to predict what if
anything should be invariant across legal systems. In other words, a parsimonious and
accurate description of the existing property system or systems should generalize in a
straightforward way to new circumstances.”).
28 Though analysis of property or resource disputes traditionally involved
consideration of two possible solutions—centralized government ownership or private
property rights—Elinor Ostrom and other scholars have demonstrated that a number
of alternatives, like managed commons, may at times be preferable. See ELINOR
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 8–21 (1990) (explaining that information costs
may make government ownership and private property rights less efficient than an
internally created solution to managing commons); see also Carol Rose, The Comedy of
the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
711, 774 (1986) (concluding that the value of certain types of property is maximized
when ownership is vested in the public and finding that, historically, custom alone was
sometimes sufficient to maintain such a system); cf. Butler, Resilience of Property,
supra note 1, at 854–55 (describing the relational frameworks within which people
have conceived of property over time); Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies,
98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 912–13 (2004) (pointing out that even informal systems of
managing property based on social norms have mitigated the factors that theory
suggests inevitably lead to tragedies of the commons or anticommons).
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The management system should, in appropriate situations, be
public- or outward-regarding as well as owner-focused. It
should recognize the connections between Smith’s property
module and the outside world. “Property law does more than
manage the complexity of human interactions” with a thing.29
It also provides a form of “governance”30 that affects political,
economic, social, and natural systems, framing what counts
and making “value choices.”31
This article examines property as a management
institution and argues that a broader, more sustainable approach
is needed to deal with the serious problems and limitations of the
dominant exclusion-based approach. Defining the exclusion
strategy as the platform for managing property rights ignores
important relations and interests adversely affected by this
owner-centric approach. The article first examines the basics of
how and why property manages, asking what is being managed,
who is affected, and for what purpose. After laying out the
foundation of property’s management role in Section I.A, the
article discusses different models of management and the legal
rules, doctrines, and policy tools for management in Section I.B.
Serious problems with the dominant approach are examined and
a broader, more sustainable approach to property’s management
role is advanced in Part II. This broader approach recognizes that
management occurs not only through individual action but also
through collective action. More particularly, it recognizes the
governance strategy as a separate and coequal model of
management that is more effective when the exclusion-based
approach cannot overcome serious externalities caused by its
individual rights focus and affecting collective interests in shared
resources. The governance strategy considers the
interconnectedness of property rights and collective interests and
is especially effective in dealing with complex situations found in
the real world. Those situations might involve a mix of property
arrangements, public goods needing more management, new
uses or resources made possible through technological advances,
and imminent public crises involving property’s impact on the
integrity of social, political, or natural systems.
29 See Singer, Law of Democracy, supra note 9, at 1303–04.
30 Singer actually describes property norms as “a form of political governance.”
Id. at 1322. My use of the term “governance” is broader, encompassing nonpolitical forms
like common interest communities and the courts.
31 Id. at 1291.
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I. PROPERTY’SMANAGEMENT ROLE
Understanding the importance of property’s management
role requires consideration of two basic questions: (1) what
relationships should be managed when property rights are
recognized and exercised? (2) what norms, goals, or purposes are
guiding the management process? The answers will shape and
affect the resulting management scheme. A system like the
dominant exclusion-based model that only covers relationships
directly and closely tied to the individual property owner will
draw a tighter circle around the management zone of property.
Under such an owner-centric system, the norms and purposes of
management will promote, primarily, the rights of individual
owners and, secondarily, certain societal interests through the
creation of wealth. Absent a broader imperative, the narrow lens
of the property owner’s self-interests generally would guide
decisions about investment, use, and transfers of the property.
To the extent that the owner’s decisions increase social welfare
and not just individual welfare, third parties could benefit as
well. Unless constrained by law, though, adverse spillovers
resulting from a property owner’s decisions will occur without
any accountability.32
A system, on the other hand, that broadens the
management zone to include impacts on indirect and even future
relationships will allow greater consideration of temporal, spatial,
and societal scales of use. Under such a system, the management
zone and the actual reach of an owner’s gatekeeping powers are
more likely to overlap. This broader approach will require
consideration of values important to the larger circle of
accountability. The relational and normative foundations of the
management function are discussed in Section I.A, while different
models of management are explored in Section I.B.
A. Relational and Normative Foundations of Property’s
Management Function
Property’s management system should govern individual
rightholders and stakeholders as they exercise their rights and
promote their interests without substantially impairing the
interests of others. Managing involves a number of activities,
including planning, organizing, directing, controlling, and
32 See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text (discussing some of the legal
constraints affecting property owners under a narrower, exclusion-based approach).
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coordinating.33 Two key qualities define the reach or magnitude of
property’s management system: the relational nature of rights
and the importance of goals and norms.
1. The Relational Dimension: What Does Property
Manage?
Identifying what a property system manages is a critical
first step. Is it just the affected thing or something more? Even
traditional systems have recognized that property at least
manages the relationship between the individual owner and the
thing and, by implication, the rest of the world.34 By making
decisions about how the thing is used, the owner necessarily
affects and limits the options of third parties generally.35
Tom Merrill explored the relationship between owners
and their resources in the article The Property Strategy.36 He
observed that the property owner has both residual managerial
authority and residual accessionary rights.37 Residual
managerial authority entitles the owner, by default, to make
decisions that affect the resource and that have an in rem or
binding effect on third parties even when the third parties have
no connection with the property.38 Though the law may constrain
the owner’s discretionary authority, the owner does “have the
last word about what will be done” with the property.39 Residual
accessionary rights, in turn, allow the owner to keep the added
value in the property, even when the added value is not due to
the owner’s efforts but rather to the surrounding community or
to government support.40 When, for example, the value of a tract
33 Managing, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1372 (2002);
see generally LINDA K. STROH ET AL., ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: A MANAGEMENT
CHALLENGE (3d ed. 2002) (examining issues in managing behavior in organizations).
34 In their casebook on property, Merrill and Smith introduce first-year
students to this traditional view right away. See THOMASW.MERRILL&HENRY E. SMITH,
PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES
ANDPOLICIES].
35 Scholars describe this impact on the rest of the world as the in rem character of
property. E.g., id. at 19 (noting that the in rem right of property reflects “the recognition of
duties in a large and indefinite class of others not to interfere with some thing”).
36 Merrill, Property Strategy, supra note 6, at 2065–67.
37 Id. at 2068.
38 Id. (explaining that managerial authority is “pretty straightforward. Start
with an owner and a discrete resource. The owner is the manager of the resource. The
owner has broad discretionary authority to decide who gets to enter or touch it, what it
will be used for, what it looks like, and whether or to what extent it will be combined
with other things in some larger enterprise. To exercise managerial authority is to be
in charge of the resource and to have the last word about what will be done with it.”).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 2067–70 (Residual accessionary rights “mean[ ] that as the value of
the resource changes, the owner automatically captures this change in value—gain or
loss. The property strategy requires that the owner—the person or entity who exercises
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of land increases due to market conditions or government
subsidies, the owner of the tract “captures this change in
value.”41 A property owner’s accessionary rights also include
rights to emergent resources like crops grown on land or the
offspring of domestic animals.42
Traditional systems also manage some horizontal and
vertical property relationships that are closely tied to, or
directly affected by, the individual owner’s exercise of rights.
Vertical relationships involve rights shared among multiple
parties at a given point in time (for example, concurrent estates)43
or rights shared in varying degrees in the same property at a
given point in time (such as an easement and the burdened
estate).44 Vertical property arrangements that are directly
affected by a property owner’s exercise of rights generally are
covered by the traditional management system. Some horizontal
relationships involving the division of ownership over time also
are managed by a traditional approach. Examples include
arrangements where one rightholder has a present interest (such
as a life estate), while another holds a future interest (such as a
remainder) or where the owner has taken successively through a
voluntary transaction from the prior owner.45 Finally, some
relationships between the owner and third parties are managed
in a limited manner by the traditional system when the
relationship involves a shared common interest arrangement
(such as a subdivision subject to restrictive covenants)46 or the
residual managerial authority—also be the one who captures changes in the value of the
thing over time.”). But cf. Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 75, 88 (2010) (explaining that historically in the United States, “[i]n many land-use
settings, for instance, colonies and states authorized their citizens or governments to
condemn rights of way across neighboring lands or even to seize lands” that had become
particularly valuable).
41 Merrill, Property Strategy, supra note 6, at 2069–70.
42 Id. at 2070.
43 For sources discussing how the traditional system manages interests in
concurrent estates, see John V. Orth, Concurrent Estates, in THOMPSON ONREAL PROPERTY
§ 31.01 (David A. Thomas ed., 2d ed. 2016); SINGER, PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 8.4.
44 For sources discussing how the traditional system manages lands subject
to easements, see THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 43, at ch. 60; SINGER,
PROPERTY, supra note 4, §§ 5.3, 5.5.
45 For sources discussing how the traditional system manages present and
future estates in the same land, see David A. Thomas, Transferability of Remainders,
in THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 43, § 23.06; SINGER, PROPERTY, supra
note 4, §§ 7.3–7.4, 7.6–7.7. For sources discussing how the traditional system manages
the relationship between the buyer and seller of real estate through covenants of title,
marketable title, and other doctrines, see THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note
43, at chs. 82, 91; SINGER, PROPERTY, supra note 4, §§ 11.3–11.4.
46 For sources discussing how the traditional system manages the interests of
neighboring landowners in a planned subdivision subject to restrictive covenants, see David
A. Thomas, Ownership as an Element of Property, in THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra
note 43, § 14.02; SINGER, PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 8.5.
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owner’s use causes foreseeable harm to neighboring land (for
instance, under common law nuisance).47
Traditional systems, however, do not generally manage
the relationships between the owner and the community at large,
especially not when the owner’s use indirectly harms a
community over time either by itself or in combination with other
similar uses.48 Nor does a traditional approach effectively cover
relationships between property owners and future generations or
between property owners and natural systems.49 Instead, the
traditional approach largely denies the accountability of property
owners for many significant spillovers affecting others over time
or undermining the integrity of biophysical systems.50
How the management zone of property is drawn affects
the relational dimensions of a property system. As Figure 1
illustrates, the traditional, exclusion-based approach, with its
owner-centric focus, limits property’s relational dimension mostly
to the decision-making zone of the individual property owner.
This owner-centric zone includes third parties violating the
owner’s rights and powers over a resource (e.g., through trespass
or conversion) as well as parties in a direct, transactional
relationship with the owner (e.g., in leasehold estates or as a
47 For sources discussing how the traditional law of nuisance imposes rights
and duties on neighboring landowners to manage harmful uses, see Alan M. Weinberger,
Restrictions on Tenant’s Use of Premises, in THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note
43, § 44.03; SINGER, PROPERTY, supra note 4, §§ 3.2–3.5.
48 See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), 564 U.S. 410 (2011). In
AEP eight states, the City of New York, and three separate land trusts sued several
electric power corporations under common law nuisance for their greenhouse gas
emissions, arguing that those emissions contributed to climate change and substantially
and unreasonably affected the public. Id. at 418–19. The Court held that the Clean Air
Act authorized EPA to regulate greenhouse gases as a pollutant and therefore displaced
federal common law rights. Id. at 424.
49 Almond growers in California provide one example of this spillover effect.
Covering 860,000 acres, almond orchards provide $11 billion annually to California’s
economy. Felicity Barringer, Water Source for Almonds in California May Run Dry, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/28/us/water-source-for-almonds-
in-california-may-run-dry.html [https://perma.cc/X629-6AAT]. While lucrative, though,
almond farms require more water than other crops and are a permanent crop. Id. In
years of drought, then, they cannot lie fallow “without losing years of investment.” Id.
Despite the major drain on California’s surface and groundwater supplies, farmers are
fighting restrictions on water use in order to protect their livelihoods. Id. Another
example comes from private and public responses to climate change. Those who
aggressively oppose responding to climate change through a conservative precautionary
approach “have assumed that the only meaningful way in which to think about and react
to potential hazards is to compare their likelihood and magnitude against the cost of
averting them; in other words, to evaluate the consequences of action or inaction.”
Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive
Rationality, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 566–67 (2004). Under this assumption,
“resort to the precautionary principle appears to be an abandonment of the quest to
maximize some overall desideratum solely in light of expected consequences.” Id. at 567.
50 See Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 1, at 870; Singer, Law of
Democracy, supra note 9, at 1297.
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buyer or seller). The traditional zone is expanded a little to
account for third parties owed a common law or statutory duty by
the property owner (e.g., neighbors directly harmed by the
owner’s land use or violation of a restrictive covenant). For the
most part, though, the traditional, exclusion-based approach
reflects the cost calculus of the individual property owner.
FIGURE 1. Two Views of Property’s Relational Dimensions
Broadening the management focus of property to include
more cooperative, shared, and outward-regarding arrangements
better reflects the actual breadth of property’s relational
dimensions.51 Such an approach would consider property’s
51 In a famous work on fundamental legal conceptions, Hohfeld demonstrated
how property entitlements can be repackaged to reflect social and individual
obligations, duties, rights, and privileges. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 710, 720, 729–
30, 733–34, 745–47 (1917); see also Hanoch Dagan, Property’s Structural Pluralism: On
Autonomy, the Rule of Law, and the Role of Blackstonian Ownership, 3 BRIGHAM-
KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 27, 30 (2014) (mentioning how Hohfeld’s analysis “makes
it (at least potentially) an exercise in legal optimism, with lawyers and judges
attempting to explicate and develop existing property forms by accentuating their
normative desirability while remaining attuned to their social context”).
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relationship with the natural environment and with future
generations. A broader zone of management would take into
account the true scales of use, enabling property to check the
exercise of rights and correct for significant spillovers not
adequately handled by transaction cost, information cost, or
other economic tools of analysis.
The traditional, exclusion-based approach reflects a cost
calculus that primarily promotes efficiency. As Henry Smith’s
information-cost theory of property explains, the structure of
property enables our system to work well. Features like the
right to exclude, the in rem power of ownership, formal
property rules, and pre-set packages of rights produce a cost-
effective scheme.52 Smith explains that “[i]nformation costs and
the need to manage complexity shape property in its
implementation.”53 Pre-set packages of rights, for example, limit
the number of choices and information interested parties must
consider, while formal rules provide much-needed clarity for
potential investors.54 Smith has problems with any norm-based
approach that leaves out delineation costs, and prefers instead
the traditional focus on the cost calculus of the individual owner.55
In Smith’s view, any needed refinement of decision making can
occur with exceptions or limitations to the exclusion-based
approach reached through a governance strategy.56 Exclusion
thus is taken as the “platform” and subsequently modified as
needed to deal with problems of fairness or efficiency through
tools like nuisance, restrictive covenants, and regulation.57
Consider the latest assaults on the Grand Canyon,
which demonstrate how narrowly property’s traditional zone of
management is drawn. They demonstrate how the cost calculus
of the traditional approach totally ignores the public interest in
public resources, especially those based on noneconomic values.
52 See Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1709–11; see also Singer, Law of
Democracy, supra note 9, at 1292–99 (discussing Smith’s approach and the lessons it
highlights).
53 Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1716.
54 See id. at 1707–08, 1711–12, 1720–21, 1725–26.
55 Id. at 1716–17 (discussing how information costs and modular theory
shape the content of our property system, not theories of property that ignore costs for
other values); see also Singer, Law of Democracy, supra note 9, at 1300 (describing
Smith’s normative goal as “mak[ing] property systems work well at minimum cost,
given the realities of human life”). Smith defines “delineation” as “defining the object of
property, specifying the legal interests in it, and providing notice to the relevant
parties.” Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1698.
56 See Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1718.
57 See id. at 1709–10. Smith is vague in describing when the governance
strategy should control decision making. One example he gives involves restrictive
covenants, which reflect a governance approach to solving a serious free-rider problem.
See id. at 1709–12.
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Two separate development projects now seriously threaten
what has been called “America’s cathedral . . . without a roof.”58
The first involves a developer and a landowner who are
planning a housing and retail development for Tusayan, a
community of less than 1000 people located two miles from the
park’s entrance on the Southern Rim.59 The town approved their
plan to build over 2000 residential units and approximately 3
million square feet of commercial development near the
Southern Rim.60 In addition to other infrastructure demands, the
plan would require water that probably could only be provided
by tapping into the aquifer feeding the Grand Canyon.61
According to projections, the proposed development would cause
Tusayan’s water use to nearly quadruple, increasing “from 175
acre-feet [of water]62 per year to 681 acre-feet per year.”63
Tusayan’s town manager responded that no final decision had
been made about the source of the water, stressing his town’s
inability to predict the options available to a developer.64 Most
locals, however, remain convinced that the water would have to
come from drilled wells.65 More wells could, in turn, lead to a
reduction in spring flow, degradation of local ecosystems, and a
shift in the area’s “poorly defined groundwater divides” that
could slow or even completely stop the flow of smaller springs.66
58 Kevin Fedarko, A Cathedral Under Siege: Two Development Projects
Threaten the Grand Canyon, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
08/10/opinion/sunday/two-development-projects-threaten-the-grand-canyon.html [https://
perma.cc/J8Y9-HE7F].
59 Id.; see FAQ, TOWN OF TUSAYAN, ARIZ., http://tusayan-az.gov/faq [https://
perma.cc/4AZ8-XN73].
60 Fedarko, supra note 58. The plan originated in the 1990s with the Stilo
Group. Id. Based in Italy, the group began buying land in the area and partnering with
local business owners to incorporate the town of Tusayan. Id. Eventually they succeeded
in gaining “a majority of seats on the town council and control” of the zoning process. Id.
61 Id.
62 An acre-foot is a measurement of volume: “the amount of water required to
cover one acre of area to the depth of one foot.” Arizona’s Water: Uses and Sources,
ARIZONAEXPERIENCE.ORG, http://arizonaexperience.org/people/arizonas-water-uses-and-
sources [https://perma.cc/M4YV-WZPD]. One acre-foot is equal to 325,851 gallons and is
generally sufficient to meet the needs of a five-member family for a year. Id.
63 Felicia Fonseca, Tiny Town Outside Grand Canyon Outlines Its Future,
GAZETTE (Feb. 28, 2014), http://gazette.com/tiny-town-outside-grand-canyon-outlines-
its-future/article/feed/95180 [https://perma.cc/VPT9-9N7U]; Eric Betz, Park Service to
Tusayan: Where Is the Water?, ARIZ. DAILY SUN (Feb. 28, 2014), http://azdailysun.com/
news/local/govt-and-politics/park-service-to-tusayan-where-is-the-water/article_f4e96ff2-a
043-11e3-bbf0-0019bb2963f4.html [https://perma.cc/RC8J-8MZQ].
64 Betz, supra note 63 (noting that project developers have even considered
using an old coal slurry pipe to pump in water).
65 See generally GRANDCANYONNAT’L PARK, DIV. OF SCI. & RES. MGMT., ISSUES
AND CONCERNS REGARDING PROPOSED GROUNDWATER DEVELOPMENTS NEAR THE SOUTH
RIM, GRAND CANYON NATIONAL PARK (2012), http://images.edocket.azcc.gov/docketpdf/00
00137832.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD7K-TMCE] [hereinafter GROUNDWATER ISSUES AND
CONCERNS].
66 Id. at 4.
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Beautiful oases such as Elves Chasm and Mystic Springs—
some of the only unaltered springs in the west—would then
simply cease to exist.67
About 25 miles away, a property developer and the leader
of the Navajo Nation have proposed building an entertainment
and shopping complex, along with a 1.6 mile tramway
descending to Navajo-owned land on the floor of the Canyon. As
reported in 2015, the project would include a tramway station, a
food pavilion, a wastewater package plant, and elevated
walkways to be located very close to an area known as the
Confluence.68 Sacred to several Native American tribes,69 this
spot presents a visual array of colors, from the turquoise
waters of the Little Colorado River to the emerald waters of the
Colorado.70 The proposed Confluence project would bring an
estimated 10,000 visitors a day into the Canyon and has caused
a divide within the Navajo Nation.71 Opponents argue that the
67 Fedarko, supra note 58. Though federal authorities rejected the plan in March
2016 because of the threat to the area’s water supply, other environmental concerns, and
widespread opposition, many fear the threat remains. Joanna Walters, Grand Canyon
Threatened Despite Win Against Developers, Conservationists Say, GUARDIAN (Mar. 13,
2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/mar/13/grand-canyon-commercial-develo
pment-tusayan-conservation [https://perma.cc/GBE4-L8YM]; William Yardley, Federal
Authorities Reject Plan for Development with 2,200 Homes Near Grand Canyon, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-sej-grand-canyon-mall-20160304-story.
html [https://perma.cc/YXC6-L333].
68 Chiara Sottile & Kristen Dahlgren, Grand Canyon Development Plan Sparks
Dispute Among Navajo, NBC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/
grand-canyon-development-plan-sparks-dispute-among-navajo-n302521 [https://perma.cc/
T2BG-NKPL].
69 Members of the Hopi tribe have made religious pilgrimages in the area
down an ancient salt trail. Rosanda Suetopka, Opponents of Grand Canyon Escalade
Meet at Confluence Project Site, NAVAJO-HOPI OBSERVER (July 22, 2014), https://www.
nhonews.com/news/2014/jul/22/opponents-of-grand-canyon-escalade-meet-at-conflu [https://
perma.cc/DX9B-HZJH]. The Navajo Nation also attributes deep spiritual meaning to the
Confluence, which, under their beliefs, is the place where life begins and where the
spirits of the dead return. Julie Cart, National Park Service Calls Development Plans a
Threat to Grand Canyon, L.A. TIMES (July 6, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-
grand-canyon-20140706-story.html [https://perma.cc/J9CL-27AD]. The spiritual significance
of the Confluence is not surprising, given its raw, unrivaled beauty. The Little Colorado
spills out of Marble Canyon, where sheer rock cliffs of polished limestone shine in white,
gray, pink, and purple. Mark Buchanan, Marble Canyon, ARIZ. ST. UNIV., http://grand
canyonhistory.clas.asu.edu/sites_coloradorivercorridor_marblecanyon.html [https://perma.c
c/P2LH-EKFR]. White salt deposits that are a half billion years old mark sandstone cliffs
some two hundred feet thick. Yolanda Youngs, Little Colorado River, ARIZ. ST. UNIV.,
http://grandcanyonhistory.clas.asu.edu/sites_coloradorivercorridor_confluence.html [https://
perma.cc/88UV-W9QB]. Bright Angel Shale and mauve limestone cap the cliff tops to create
a stunning, incomparable natural wonder. Id.
70 Martin Fletcher, Grand Canyon Cable Cars Threaten Grandeur of One of




71 About, SAVE THE CONFLUENCE, http://savetheconfluence.com/about [https://
perma.cc/88Q6-UHU5].
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project would endanger the Canyon’s fragile ecosystem and the
lifestyle of tribal members in the area.72 With only 300 feet
separating the tourist attractions and the Confluence, opponents
are concerned that tourists will wander from the tourist
attractions and desecrate their sacred sites, and that wastewater
or sewage runoff will irreparably harm the area.73 Despite these
concerns, the lead developer has argued that the project would
improve the Canyon experience by providing the average person
the ability “to feel the canyon from the bottom.”74
Both projects would irreversibly harm the Grand
Canyon—one by depleting much of the water needed for the
Canyon’s ecosystems and the other by destroying the
transcendence of the Canyon experience. Both would free-ride
on the common American heritage and on government support
of the Canyon. The Tusayan Project would tap valuable and
scarce water resources without accounting for the impact on
the Canyon’s ecosystems. The area’s aquifers and dependent
seeps and streams are extremely delicate. Despite the efforts of
many researchers, some of the hydrogeological elements of the
Southern Rim still remain unknown. Experts worry that aquifers
may not be able to sustain current water needs for much longer,
let alone an increased demand.75 One study, for example, found
that the Indian Springs well, drilled in the 1980s, had already
resulted in a ten percent decrease in spring flow at Indian
Gardens.76 Increased groundwater withdrawals could cause
further reductions77 or even make some flows seasonal.78 This
change could harm or even eliminate species of flora and fauna
that cannot spread or relocate to another water source.79 Seasonal
72 Id.
73 Sam Seiniger, Indigenous Religious Traditions, COLO. COLL., http://sites.
coloradocollege.edu/indigenoustraditions/sacred-lands/3285-2 [https://perma.cc/GB2A-38
WB]; Rhiannon Edwards, Grand Canyon ‘Threatened’ by Development, TELEGRAPH (July
25, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/northamerica/usa/10989189/
Grand-Canyon-threatened-by-development.html [https://perma.cc/XZC6-JH2A]. The Hopi
tribe also has opposed the development and the Navajo Nation leadership. Laurel
Morales, Proposed Gondola for Grand Canyon’s Rim Has Community on Edge, NPR (Aug.
4, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/08/04/337144825/proposed-gondola-for-grand-canyons-
rim-has-community-on-edge [https://perma.cc/X4Q6-MKWA].
74 Cart, supra note 69 (“The park service offers nothing more than ‘a drive-by
wilderness experience,’ Whitmer said. ‘The average person can’t ride a mule to the
bottom of the canyon. We want them to feel the canyon from the bottom.’”). The
Confluence Project also has been put on hold. SeeWalters, supra note 67.
75 See GROUNDWATER ISSUES AND CONCERNS, supra note 65, at 24–25.
76 See id. at 17; Betz, supra note 63.
77 See Fedarko, supra note 58; GROUNDWATER ISSUES AND CONCERNS, supra
note 65, at 23–24.
78 See GROUNDWATER ISSUES AND CONCERNS, supra note 65, at 24.
79 See id.
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springs could also make water sources unreliable, posing a danger
to hikers and visitors.80
The Confluence Project would free ride on the Grand
Canyon’s visual and raw beauty, drawing many visitors to a
secluded and unique natural wonder that would be forever
changed. Multicolored cliffs 3200 feet high, touched only by
nature and a few dedicated hikers, wall in the Canyon.81 If the
project proceeds, these walls would be draped in 1.6 miles of
cable.82 The sacred place where the green and blue waters meet
would be surrounded by two elevated walkways, an
amphitheater, a shop, and a food pavilion.83 The development
would also include hotels, restaurants, shops, and a cultural
center.84 Even if tourists follow the rules and remain only on
the walkways, the sounds of thousands of visitors each day
would surely pollute the once silent site,85 and the lighting
required by the proposed amphitheater would illuminate one of
the most naturally dark places in the continental United
States.86 In addition to this visual marring, the project would
produce air and water pollution, sewage flow, and waste-water
runoff that would not only scar the pristine beauty of the
Confluence, but also threaten endangered fish indigenous to
the Little Colorado River.87
What both projects ignore is the uniqueness of the
Grand Canyon—its irreplaceable grandeur, its compelling
testament to the planet’s history, and its spiritual lessons for
humanity. People have experienced the Canyon for thousands
of years—from the earliest human use 13,000 years ago, to the
settlers and miners in the late 1800s, to the present day.88 The
walls of the Canyon plunge more than a mile down and consist
80 See id.
81 See Fedarko, supra note 58. For a description of the Grand Canyon’s geological
features, see Sarah Bohl Gerke & Paul Hirt, Geology, ARIZ. ST. UNIV., http://grandcanyon
history.clas.asu.edu/history_science_geology.html [https://perma.cc/L9KX-72GF].
82 Fletcher, supra note 70.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See Edwards, supra note 73; Seiniger, supra note 73.
86 See Edwards, supra note 73.
87 Michael Kuhne, Critics Say Multi-million Dollar Development Will Mar Grand
Canyon’s Grandeur, Threaten Ecosystem, ACCUWEATHER.COM (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.
accuweather.com/en/weather-news/grand-canyon-development-criticized/31732037 [https://
perma.cc/TZH3-TZJT].
88 See Patricia Biggs & Paul Hirt, Humans at Grand Canyon, ARIZ. ST. UNIV.,
http://grandcanyonhistory.clas.asu.edu/history_humansatgrandcanyon.html [https://perma.
cc/BH3L-RCDN]; see generally Archeological Resources, NAT’L PARKS SERV., http://www.nps.
gov/grca/historyculture/arch.htm [https://perma.cc/2SUM-LCPC] (discussing human history
at the Grand Canyon).
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of at least twenty distinct layers of stone.89 These layers
represent more than a third of Earth’s life span, extending back
1.8 billion years.90 What both projects discard is each American’s
birthright and responsibility.91 The owner-centric focus of the
exclusion-based approach allows—even encourages—this
discarding to occur.
Under an exclusion-based approach, property owners
generally need only manage for their own rights and self-
interests. The focus on exclusion as the core of property narrows
the institution of property to an individualistic, owner-centric
system.92 Exclusion-based thinking encourages a property owner
to use property in ways that maximize value even when those
uses impact cherished and publicly shared resources like the
Grand Canyon. Exclusion-based thinking incentivizes a water-
rights holder to withdraw surface water with little, if any,
thought given to the instream-flow needs or ecological integrity
of the watercourse; and if the rights holder is part of the
Western prior appropriation system, they might even face the
pressure of the “use it or lose it” mentality.93 Such an approach
marginalizes the governance management strategy, overlooking
property arrangements that are more cooperative, shared or
outward-regarding.94 Broadening the management approach to
89 Fedarko, supra note 58; see also Gerke & Hirt, supra note 81 (discussing the
Canyon’s geology). The cliffs, infused with ancient mineral deposits, reflect hues of red,
yellow, and green. See Geology Fieldnotes, NAT’L PARKS SERV., http://www.nature.nps.gov/
Geology/parks/grca/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/28ZG-ZXDD].
90 Greater Grand Canyon Region, AZWILD.ORG, http://www.azwild.org/regions/
grandcanyon.php [https://perma.cc/4WRB-EVZG]. The Canyon walls reveal the history of
the Colorado River and an ancient sea. ANNABELLE FOOS, GEOLOGY DEP’T, UNIV. OF
AKRON, GEOLOGY OF GRAND CANYON NATIONAL PARK, NORTH RIM 5–6, http://www.nature.
nps.gov/geology/education/foos/grand.pdf [https://perma.cc/VCU3-2FJZ]. Only six million
years old, the river carved its place through stone that has been there for nearly two billion
years. See Grand Canyon Field Notes, supra note 89.
91 In 1903, Theodore Roosevelt eloquently expressed his impressions of the
Grand Canyon as he toured the Western states and visited Arizona for the first time. In a
speech at the South Rim of the Canyon, Roosevelt celebrated the unique, natural beauty
of the Grand Canyon. Theodore Roosevelt, The Natural Wonder of the Grand Canyon
(May 6, 1903), in GREAT SPEECHES OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 1–2 (Bob Blaisdell ed.,
2011). He expressed his hope that man would not place “a building of any kind . . . to mar
the wonderful grandeur, the sublimity, the great loneliness and beauty of the canyon.” Id.
at 2. He urged all to “[l]eave it as it is. You cannot improve on it. The ages have been at
work on it, and man can only mar it.” Id.
92 See Dagan, supra note 51, at 29–30.
93 See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 5:87 (2010)
(discussing loss of prior appropriation rights due to non-use); Lynda L. Butler,
Environmental Water Rights: An Evolving Concept of Public Property, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
323, 365–66 (1990) (explaining that the prior appropriation doctrine does not “offer
much hope for the public interest in instream use. Due to the doctrine’s actual
diversion and beneficial use requirements, consumptive uses clearly are favored over
nonconsumptive interests.”).
94 See Dagan, supra note 51, at 29–30 (describing how a market approach
ignores property arrangements involving cooperative interactions between spouses and
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consider actual spatial and temporal impacts would mean that
the scope of the first project would look much smaller and the
second might not even occur.
To be effective in the long-term, property’s management
system must organize a society’s resources among its members—
present and future—in ways that promote social cohesion,
political and economic stability, social-ecological systems
integrity, and consistency with the society’s core values.95
Without such a focus, property is at best a loosely anchored
system of individual rights, inherently self-serving, with no
internal and few external checks to monitor the exercise of
rights. Without such constraints, property lacks the mechanisms
for gathering feedback on the full scale of use and for making
the adjustments necessary for system integrity.96 If property
does not promote the integrity of core systems along with the
rights of individual owners, property eventually will cease to
function as a protector of individual liberty, defeated by its own
adverse impacts on natural and social systems. As Joseph Singer
explains, if property “shape[s] the character of [human]
interactions. . . . , then property law should reflect and shape our
deepest values.”97 A discussion of property’s management role then
necessarily must involve consideration of core norms and values.98
2. Property’s Norms and Goals
One response to the position that property should
manage not only to coordinate among owners and their
resources, as Smith maintains,99 but also to promote core
values is that the institution of property takes no position on
within common interest communities). Hanoch Dagan emphasizes the importance of
“recogniz[ing] the significant role that our social values play in our conception of
property.” Id. at 31.
95 Singer defines property as providing “a baseline for social relations
compatible with democracy.” Singer, Law of Democracy, supra note 9, at 1304
(emphasis omitted). My definition of property’s management function is broader in the
sense that it includes ecological and physical systems affected by adverse property
uses. The implications of my approach for political systems also could differ because of
this broader approach.
96 See Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 1, at 889–91.
97 Singer, Law of Democracy, supra note 9, at 1299.
98 See id. at 1320–21 (Singer explains that governance strategies do not
simply “represent a gloss on a core exclusion strategy.” For example, a property owner’s
“right to be free from expropriation . . . . embodies fundamental normative choices
about the powers that go along with ownership in a free and democratic society.”).
99 Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1698–99 (describing the function of
property as the delineation of interests, which “involves defining the object of property,
specifying the legal interests in it, and providing notice to the relevant parties,
including duty bearers and enforcers”).
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what those values should be.100 Yet some norms must be
guiding the institutional choices made. Smith’s information-
cost analysis, for example, can only be relevant within the
normative framework of the marketplace, which he assumes
without acknowledging or justifying.101 Smith recognized that
the norms of fairness, justice, virtue, and efficiency are at play
in particular contexts when serious problems of injustice,
unfairness, or inefficiency arise.102 He, however, viewed these
values as “emergent properties” of the property system
applicable only to specific situations, but not to the whole in
defining each rule or doctrine.103 As he explained, each part of
the system or attribute of property need not promote all of
these values.104 Instead, under his approach, specific problems
of unfairness, inefficiency, and injustice trigger use of the
governance strategy.105 When no serious problem exists, however,
the cost calculus of the individual gatekeeper drives the operation
of property as a system, with cost considerations and wealth
maximization motivating the self-interested, rational actor.106
Efficiency values thus are given a dual role—both under
the exclusion-based decisions of the individual owner and, when
triggered, under the governance strategy for dealing with specific
problems of inefficiency and possibly unfairness and injustice. The
dominant approach to property rights implicitly recognizes that
the marketplace norm of efficiency guides the individual owner’s
decisions. Other norms fundamental to a democratic political
structure are ignored for the purpose of delineating and defining
property rights. Yet these other norms and values should matter
in defining an institution like property that is so central to political
and economic systems. Other fundamental values and norms
should matter when the singular use of the efficiency norm
raises serious integrity issues for other vital systems. The focus
of the exclusion-based approach on the property owner’s self-
interests omits much of the owner’s relationships with society.
The narrow approach, in particular, ignores the distributive
consequences of property, which can either promote or tear apart
100 Id. at 1717 (expressing problems with a normative-based approach because
it leaves out delineation costs); see also Singer, Law of Democracy, supra note 9, at
1300 (describing Smith’s approach as making property work well at minimal cost).
101 See Singer, Law of Democracy, supra note 9, at 1302–03 (describing Smith
as assuming a normative framework).
102 Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1719.
103 Id. at 1718–20.
104 Id. at 1719.
105 See id. at 1710, 1718.
106 See id. at 1691 (describing the baselines found in property as shaped by
information costs); id. at 1694 (noting that information costs shape the architecture
and structure of property).
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social cohesion. It also ignores the owner’s relationship with
larger natural systems, such as the atmosphere and climate, on
which property and life depend. To promote system integrity,
property’s normative framework should integrate other relational
planes or perspectives—planes involving the spectrum of
property arrangements in relation to natural systems, in
relation to political and economic systems, and so on.107
A number of leading scholars have considered how to
identify these core norms and values. Some of their responses
have focused on a singular value, identifying a particular norm
as critical to our property system.108 Others have taken a more
complicated approach, envisioning property as promoting a
range of values critical to life in a pluralistic society109 or, more
particularly, to life in a democracy.110
Joseph Singer’s scholarship exemplifies the latter. He
argued that our fundamental political values of democracy and
liberty impose structural constraints on our property system.111
In a recent article, he explored what those constraints are by
asking a series of questions.112 Through those questions, Singer
identified core values and norms—such as dispersed ownership,
equality, and freedom—that reflect his theory of property law as
“a quasi-constitutional framework for social life” in a
democracy.113 “Property law is designed to spread freedom,
107 See Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 1, at 899–908 (discussing the
dialectical process through which contemporary property regimes have evolved).
108 See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 3 (3d ed. 2008) (focusing on property’s
role in promoting liberty and freedom); ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD 7–9 (2003) (examining private property
through an environmental ethic); Richard A. Epstein, Property as a Fundamental Civil
Right, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 187, 188–94 (1992) (viewing efficiency as a fundamental norm
of a system of private property).
109 See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Essay, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 1409, 1438–39 (2012) (describing property as differing sets of rights
practically constructed to suit particular values of different social institutions).
110 See generally Singer, Law of Democracy, supra note 9, at 1303–24
(examining property in light of our fundamental democratic values).
111 Id. at 1301, 1303.
112 Among others, Singer asks: What types of property rights should a democracy
allow? Id. at 1303. How should property ownership be dispersed in a democracy? That is,
how much property should one person own? Id. at 1308. “Who [c]an [o]wn [p]roperty in a
[d]emocracy”—anyone or just some classes of people? Id. at 1313. What types of obligations
are consistent with property ownership in a democracy? Id. at 1319.
113 Id. at 1334–35. To illustrate the dispersed ownership norm, for example, he
discusses the case of the Hawaiian island of Lanai. Id. at 1308–10. Though the island is
inhabited by a few thousand people, it is almost entirely owned by one man. Id. at 1308.
Singer suggests that Americans might find this situation troubling because property
ownership is tantamount to self-determination under the American tradition. See id. at
1309. The American conception of democracy thus must be premised on dispersed
ownership of property, allowing the people to make the decisions, instead of a king. See
id. at 1309–10.
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opportunity, security, and wealth, but it is also designed to
prevent owners from inflicting harm on others and from acting
in a manner that is incompatible with norms of propriety.”114
Under his theory, then, property norms provide “a form of
political governance” that reflects “fundamental normative
choices” about the allocation of power in a democracy.115
Singer’s discussion illustrates how property rights are
implicitly shaped by a society’s structural foundation. Limits, and
therefore obligations, become woven into the essence of property
rights from the outside. More extensive use of the governance
approach would bring these larger picture constraints into the
calculus to manage the exercise of property rights in ways that
are consistent with a society’s foundational principles. The
governance strategy should not be viewed as an exception to the
main management “platform” of property, the exclusion
strategy,116 but rather as an independent tool for relating property
to core systems in ways that promote their integrity and check
the operation of the property system. If, for example, only
Caucasians could own property under a state’s property law,
the federal constitutional norm of equality would be violated,117
creating a fundamental conflict between the property and
political systems. If, for instance, only one party owned all the
land in a locality, the fundamental efficiency norm of America’s
economic system would be violated, leading to serious economic
problems and social unrest.118 If, for example, property owners
were conducting uses that seriously polluted the atmosphere and
drastically altered the global climate system, the integrity of
Earth’s biophysical systems would be seriously threatened. The
governance strategy can head off these crises by integrating
norms critical to fundamental systems into the management of
property rights. In a democracy, those values might include
some sense of equality of freedom, meaningful economic
opportunity, and long-term sustainability of natural systems.119
114 Id. at 1324.
115 Id. at 1321–22.
116 Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1710.
117 See Singer, Law of Democracy, supra note 9, at 1301–02, 1312–14.
118 See id. at 1309–10 (arguing that information costs are much higher when one
person owns all of the land in a locality, making such a system less efficient than when
property ownership is dispersed). In Singer’s example of the Hawaiian island of Lanai, he
explains that the economic fortunes of the island turn on the sole owner’s decision of
whether to install potentially lucrative wind turbines and risk destroying some of the
island’s aesthetic value necessary for tourism. See id. at 1309. The issue has caused a rift
between, and anxiety among, the residents, who have been left in the dark about the
extent of the plan’s possible ramifications. Id.
119 Singer takes a broad approach, envisioning property as providing a “baseline
for social relations compatible with democracy.” Id. at 1304 (emphasis omitted). Even he,
1238 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:3
Property conflicts involving the first two norms—equality of
freedom and meaningful economic opportunity—generally have
been resolved in their favor.120 Conflicts involving the third—
long-term sustainability of natural systems—still have not been
resolved in ways that bring a greater sense of environmental
accountability into property’s management system.121
Through its management role, property can become a
system for organizing a society’s resources among its members,
present and future, in ways that promote social cohesion, economic
and political stability, and sustainability of natural systems. The
traditional, exclusion-based approach, with its owner-centric
focus, leaves out the collective interest in the sustainability of
vital natural systems and in the social cohesion promoted by fair
distribution of meaningful economic opportunities. The traditional
approach tends to subordinate the collective interest to private
property interests, allowing significant resource hoarding and a
great divide between the haves and the have-nots.122 Property
owners are not usually accountable for harm that accumulates
slowly over time, that affects public goods or other collective
interests, or that seriously impacts future generations. The
common law generally restricts the nuisance liability of
landowners to substantial harm directly caused by a property
owner’s unreasonable interference.123 Modern property law and
theory also tend to ignore constraints related to the integrity of
though, ignores ecological integrity issues, focusing instead on political and economic
governance. Cf. id. at 1300–01. For example, he defines core values embedded in our
property system as including “protect[ing] the freedom of individuals, . . . treat[ing] each
person with equal concern and respect, and . . . liv[ing] in a free and democratic society.”
Id. at 1319.
120 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1948) (ruling that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from judicial enforcement of racially
discriminatory covenants); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (ruling that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from state interference of property rights
without due process of law); see also, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241–
43 (1984) (recognizing the purpose of dispersing land ownership as a public use under the
Takings Clause); Puerto Rico v. E. Sugar Assocs., 156 F.2d 316, 325 (1st Cir. 1946)
(acknowledging the legitimacy of a land redistribution law under which large sugar cane
plantations were divided and dispersed among squatters and small farmers to solve
associated social and economic problems in Puerto Rico).
121 See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), 564 U.S. 410, 423–24
(2011) (holding that the Clean Air Act displaces the federal common law doctrine of
nuisance as a means for controlling environmental damage caused by fossil fuel
emissions).
122 See supra notes 1–9, 34–49 and accompanying text (discussing the
limitations of the traditional, exclusion-based approach to management).
123 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (AM. LAW INST. 1979). For a
discussion of the limits of common law nuisance in dealing with climate change and for
an intriguing suggestion to apply the golden rules of transboundary nuisance disputes
to determine the appropriate standard of liability, see Thomas W. Merrill, Global
Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 328–32 (2005).
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natural systems.124 In addition to focusing on the property
owner’s self-interests, the analytical methods used to define
property’s management role need to consider the impact on
natural, political, and economic systems to avoid serious
challenges to their integrity.
B. How Property Manages
How, then, does property actually manage the
relationships between rightholders, resources subject to the
rights, and the rest of the world? Under the American property
system, exclusion traditionally is the starting point, the
motivator for action, and the initial guide for decision making.125
Through various common law doctrines, rules, and policies, it
incentivizes decision makers to maximize use of owned resources
by allowing the owner to keep the reasonable return on
investment and to count on the legal system to protect the
owned resources from intruders and interlopers. It is the
starting point, the gap-filler for tangible resources, but not the
end game. Just as astronauts on a space shuttle need a rocket
to thrust them into space and allow them to conduct their
mission, property owners need to be propelled into action along
a course that promotes social, as well as individual, welfare
and that does not harm important, long-term public interests.
The traditional governance strategy helps property owners to
respond, in specific situations, to certain problems of injustice,
unfairness, and inefficiency that are directly linked to the
exercise of property rights. While the exclusion strategy
effectively protects the core of property rights in physical
resources, it becomes less effective managing rights in
intangible resources, public goods, and shared or common
resources. A broader governance strategy is needed to consider
more complex resource situations and relational interests
overlooked by the exclusionary approach.
1. The Exclusion Strategy: Protecting the Core
The exclusion strategy to property defines and allocates
property rights by delegating decision-making power over a
resource to a party, giving that party the general authority to
decide about use and transfer of property interests in the
124 But see FREYFOGLE, supra note 108, at 8–9, 203 (arguing for an approach
to property ownership that includes an environmental ethic).
125 See supra notes 1–7, 43–52 and accompanying text (describing the traditional
American property system approach).
1240 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:3
resource, to monitor the property, and to protect the party’s
rights from encroachment and interference.126 Smith’s
information-cost theory of property provides an insightful
explanation of how property operates under the exclusion
strategy to protect the core of property. He discusses how an
exclusion-based model manages by delegating broad powers to
the gatekeeper owner, by enforcing in rem powers against third
parties (for example, through common law and statutory notice
doctrines), by using pre-set packages of rights to establish the
basic units of property,127 and by using “rough proxies” to
implement the system.128 Under Smith’s theory, the exclusion
strategy manages the complexity of interactions between
property owners and the outside world through property
modules, or “semiautonomous components.”129 The modular
architecture regulates the interactions by limiting the interfaces,
or portals of entry, between the internal world of property
owners and the external world.130 Information that is irrelevant
to interactions with the external world is walled off,
encapsulated within modular clusters through various property
rules and features.131 According to Smith, the permitted
connections or portals “correspond to the most important
spillover[s].”132 This control over the interfaces streamlines the
interactions and decreases the dependency of property owners
126 Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 1, at S454–55.
127 See Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1709–12 (discussing the
structure of property).
128 Id. at 1718 (discussing rough proxies).
129 Id. at 1703. Smith explains that modularity is the simplification of complex
interactions into manageable clusters of information, physical features, or customary
practices that serve as interfaces with the outside world. See id. at 1700–02. Smith
describes modularity as “a key design principle in . . . evolutionary theory, cognitive
science,” engineering, architecture, and other systems. Id. at 1702. A growing body of
literature, for example, is developing a modular theory of organizations. See, e.g.,
CARLISS Y. BALDWIN&KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES: THE POWER OFMODULARITY 1–18
(2000); MANAGING IN THE MODULAR AGE: ARCHITECTURES, NETWORKS, AND
ORGANIZATIONS 1–9 (Raghu Garud et al. eds., 2003); Richard N. Langlois, Modularity
in Technology and Organization, 49 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 19, 19–20 (2002); Ron
Sanchez & Joseph T. Mahoney, Modularity, Flexibility, and Knowledge Management in
Product and Organization Design, 17 STRATEGICMGMT. J. 63, 63 (1996).
130 See Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1707–08 (explaining how
modularity of property works and how it allows for the standardization of property).
Entity property—that is, more complex forms of property involving asset partitioning—
reflects modularization with a hierarchical structure. Id. at 1722. Assets of a firm, for
example, are partitioned off from the assets of its owners and of other firms. See id.
Thus, the firm’s creditors can evaluate the firm without having to consider the claims
of the owners’ and other firms’ creditors. Id.; see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390, 393, 440
(2000) (discussing the “essential role” of organizational law in “modern society” and
describing organizational law, at “its essential core,” as “property law, not contract”).
131 Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1701–02.
132 Id. at 1710–11.
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on the external world.133 “The architecture of property [thus]
emerges from the process of” delineating use interests in a cost-
effective way.134
Merrill and Smith provide a compelling case for how the
architecture of property effectively controls the flow of
information and the interactions among property owners and the
outside world in their article on the numerus clausus doctrine.135
They explain how the numerus clausus concept provides a list of
choices for pre-set packages of property rights—basically acting
like a drop-down menu on a web page. Prospective owners, for
example, can choose between different types of fee simple
estates, between fee simple estates and life estates, between
different types of tenancies, and so on.136 By limiting the
available forms of property rights, the numerus clausus doctrine
decreases the information costs facing parties deciding how or
whether to invest.137 The doctrine reduces network confusion
over available options, assuring prospective investors that only a
limited number of forms are possible.138 Limiting property’s
forms promotes standardization, controlling the interface with
the outside world.139 Numerus clausus, in other words, helps to
maintain the building blocks of property at an optimal level.140
This subtle architectural and operational structure of
property is exactly what those urging greater use of contract
principles in traditional property settings have missed.141 The
133 See id. at 1702–03 (explaining how information irrelevant to the outside
world remains within the capsule and the owner’s control); id. at 1707–08 (explaining
how modularity leads to standardization of property, limiting “interconnections
between packages of [property] rights” and creating network effects).
134 Id. at 1704–05.
135 SeeMerrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 15, at 26–38.
136 See id. at 12–20.
137 Id. at 8, 26–27, 33.
138 Id. at 45–48.
139 See Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1707–08, 1711. The numerus
clausus doctrine limits the forms of available packages of property rights, incorporating
formalism into the structure of property to encourage standardization. Id. at 1706, 1711–
13. Smith explains that formalism in property promotes alienability, persistence, and
compatibility of property rights. Id. at 1710. For example, when the property rights of a
landowner are standardized, it is much easier to sell (alienability), establish title to
(persistence), and join adjacent parcels to the land (compatibility) than if third parties
were left on their own to guess what rights the landowner has. Id. at 1710–13.
140 See Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 15, at 38–40 (discussing
how numerus clausus produces optimal standardization); see also id. at 42–58 (rebutting
potential objections to their numerus clausus theory).
141 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.1 & cmt. a (AM.
LAW INST. 2000) (rejecting the traditional property approach of treating the doctrines of
easements, profits, and covenants as distinct in favor of an integrative contracts
approach); Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in 22 NOMOS: PROPERTY 69,
78–79 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (arguing that today, property
ownership is conceived in terms of contractual arrangements and is incompatible with
traditional property law); Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes:
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forgotten structure of property is exactly what Hernando de Soto
bemoaned in calling for greater understanding of the mysteries
of capital, especially of how western property systems tap into
the “invisible” potential of assets.142 The hidden structure of
property also explains how property has, in a social-systems
sense, become a self-organizing system, set in motion by its
structure and its networks of communication. It is self-
organizing or self-regulating in the sense that the processes that
shape property rights can occur endogenously, without external
force, “dictated by the ‘internal rules’” of the property system.143
The institution of property establishes behavioral rules by
using its own infrastructure to shape and evaluate a series of
interactions between people, rightholders, and their resources.
The marketplace, the main network for economic communication,
typically carries out the rightholders’ decisions, while the courts,
the main network for legal communication, generally announce
the rules and standards governing behavior.144 Property, then, is
the central legal and social device for integrating power over
resources into daily life and promoting the emergence of new
structures and behavioral rules to deal with more complex
resource settings.145
The concept of benefits and burdens running with the land
demonstrates how property’s legal infrastructure works.146 Long
the bane of property students, the common law concept of running
with the land serves the important function of giving an in rem
effect, at low cost, to the rights of benefitted property owners and
their successors against burdened landowners and their successors.
Through the concept of running with the land, property manages
rights in affected resources for the present and the future.
Easements appurtenant, for instance, attach to the land and pass
with a conveyance of the burdened and benefitted tracts even if
Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1304–18 (1982) (arguing that a
single body of law that adopts contract principles can replace the traditional property
doctrines of easements, covenants, and equitable servitudes).
142 DE SOTO, supra note 10, at 7.
143 See FRITJOF CAPRA & PIER LUIGI LUISI, THE SYSTEMS VIEW OF LIFE: A
UNIFYING VISION 144–45 (2014) (defining scientific aspects of self-organization); see also
Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 1, at 886–90 (discussing how behavioral
patterns and social norms frame choices and guide property owners along certain
normative paths).
144 See CAPRA & LUISI, supra note 143, at 308–09 (discussing how social
systems may self-organize).
145 See id. at 311–13 (discussing different types of power and the “central role”
that power plays “in the emergence of social structures”).
146 De Soto refers to the “implicit legal infrastructure hidden deep within”
Western property systems in explaining why he believes Western nations have been able
to create capital, while developing and formerly communist countries have not succeeded.
DE SOTO, supra note 10, at 8–9.
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the easement is not mentioned in the deed.147 Restrictive
covenants run with the land if they meet certain requirements,
such as touch and concern, that act as sieves, distinguishing
between restrictions that are bound up with the land and those
that are the personal obligations of the landowner.148 These
property sieves prevent personal obligations from passing
through to successor owners and allow the restrictions that are
bound up with the land to persist—a feature of property’s
architecture that is misunderstood or discounted by reformists
advocating a contract approach to restrictive covenants.149
Property manages relationships between owners and
resources, owners and third parties, owners and society, and
present and future owners through a variety of tools. Tom
Merrill discusses some of these tools in a number of articles.150
He notes how the doctrine of waste serves as the default rule
for managing horizontal sharing of resources, balancing rights
in resources over time when the holder of the present estate
has less than the maximum collection of ownership rights.151
He explains how rules against direct restraints on alienation
manage entry and exit, allowing changes in the gatekeeper
through marketplace transactions.152 Relations with third
parties are managed through trespass laws protecting the right
to exclude,153 common law and statutory notice rules protecting
qualifying landowners,154 and rules defining the nature and
147 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 5.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2000);
see also id. § 5.1 cmt. b, illus. 1 (discussing how the transfer of a recorded, appurtenant
easement flows from the original owner of Blackacre granting the easement, burdening
the subsequent owner, while benefiting the original and subsequent owners of
Whiteacre).
148 See SINGER, PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 6.1, at 226–27, § 6.2, at 235–36.
149 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of
Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1357–58 (1982) (arguing that individual choice and
intent should control servitudes once the notice requirement is met); French, supra note
141, at 1309–10 (arguing that the touch and concern doctrine is not needed to protect
purchasers of land from uncommon affirmative obligations, and instead, that a
reasonableness inquiry into the intent of the original covenanting parties is sufficient).
The Restatement (Third) of Property generally takes a contract approach to servitudes.
PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, supra note 34, at 1040 (describing how the
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes “takes a more contractarian approach to
servitudes”).
150 See, e.g., Merrill, Property Strategy, supra note 6, at 2076–89; Thomas W.
Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 13, 35–45 (1985) [hereinafter Merrill, Costs].
151 Merrill, Costs, supra note 150, at 41–42.
152 Merrill, Property Strategy, supra note 6, at 2079–80.
153 Merrill, Costs, supra note 150, at 13.
154 See id. at 37–38 (explaining that a builder of a structure that encroaches on
another’s land is deemed to be on notice of the property boundary before construction and
is strictly liable for the encroachment); Merrill, Property Strategy, supra note 6, at 2078
(explaining that rules requiring the state to give landowners prospective notice of
changes in land regulations help to protect landowners’ expectations).
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scope of property rights.155 Smith adds that what he describes
as property’s “modular structure” is managed by limitations on
the unbundling of packages of rights.156 Some of the limitations,
for example, are built into the features of property rights157 or
into its formalistic structure, as reflected primarily in the
numerus clausus doctrine.158 Fee simple estates, for instance,
have developed into several pre-set and strictly construed
ownership packages that all are potentially infinite in duration
but vary in their degrees of control.159 Smith also notes that
property’s modular structure has even affected how property
law adjusts and adapts to new resource uses through its
incorporation of custom.160
The exclusion strategy has played a central role in the
emergence of property rights in physical resources, working
well much of the time. It loses its conceptual power, however,
as resources become more intangible, social networks become
more complex, and important collective interests are ignored or,
worse yet, harmed. In these situations, setting the boundaries of
the reasonable expectations of property owners may require a
strategy that more effectively taps into social networks and
affirmatively takes into account collective interests. Important
feedbacks, or inputs from natural or social systems, are
overlooked by the exclusion strategy; they include aggregate or
diffused harm from long-term property use, inequality or
unfairness in the distribution of resources severe enough to
undermine social cohesion, and sustainability of natural
resources.161 These overlooked areas coincide with limitations of
the exclusion strategy that are inherent in or not effectively
155 See Merrill, Property Strategy, supra note 6, at 2069–70 (defining the nature
of ownership rights as including the right to reasonable expectation of gain free from
unlawful interference); Merrill, Costs, supra note 150, at 42–43 (defining the scope of use
rights created by easements).
156 Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1701, 1707–13.
157 See id. at 1709–11 (discussing basic features like the right to exclude and
in rem nature of property as well as secondary features like alienability).
158 See id. at 1710–12.
159 See PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, supra note 34, at 504–06.
160 Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1720–21. Longstanding customary
practices, for example, can provide lawmakers with helpful signals of when law and
practice are at odds or when the law has failed to ratify the reasonable expectations of
property owners or the community. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT
LAW: HOWNEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 65–81 (1991) (discussing the practice of farmers
and cattle ranchers in Shasta County, California, of dismissing their entitlements under
the law in favor of using informal norms to determine who should bear the costs of
building boundary fences between their respective land); Smith, Law of Things, supra
note 7, at 1720–21 (discussing how custom is incorporated into property law).
161 Climate change is probably the best example of an output of our property
system that is totally ignored and, sometimes, even denied. See infra notes 197–207,
210–221 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of climate change).
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handled by the strategy. Smith and Merrill deal with some of
the limitations of the exclusion strategy through a more
restricted governance strategy, but they define the exclusion-
based approach as the primary platform and governance simply
as focusing on “individuated uses of resources.”162 In Smith’s
words, governance is the “golden rule” of property, coming into
play in certain select situations raising fairness or efficiency
concerns.163 This subordinate, individuated approach is not
robust enough to deal with the significant limitations of the
exclusion-based model, much less with complex collective
interests injured because of those limitations. A broader
approach to the governance approach is needed.
2. The Governance Strategy: Complex Relational
Considerations
A broader governance strategy to managing property
rights would look beyond the owner-thing relation to consider
collective interests and other complex relational interests that
would be seriously harmed or affected by the exercise of property
rights, sometimes even to the point of unsustainability.164 Such a
strategy would consider whether the exclusion-based approach
is inherently unable to handle a serious societal or natural
system problem like climate change. It would consider whether
the externalities from the exercise of exclusion-based property
rights are so serious that they threaten the integrity of one or
more foundational systems. When important collective interests
are at stake—for example, when the public shares vital
resources with property owners—an exclusion-based approach
ignores those interests unless an independent third-party
manager (like the judiciary) steps in to resolve conflicts in a way
that checks the decision making of the gatekeeper. Such a course
correction would take into account resource conditions, societal
norms, and the true scales of use.
Smith, Merrill, and other property theorists who see
exclusion as the primary basis for delineating and managing
property rights view the governance strategy simply as a tool
for adjusting results in individual or particular contexts when
162 Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1705; see also Merrill, Property
Strategy, supra note 6, at 2063–71 (explaining that the “right to exclude is a necessary
condition of identifying something as being property,” and describing governance rules
in any given property regime as varying between societies).
163 Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1692–93, 1705.
164 For application of the governance strategy to constitutional property, see
Butler, Governance Function, supra note 1, at 1757–67.
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the interface between modular components becomes too
complex for the exclusion strategy.165 Under this narrow view of
the governance strategy, private governance principles can be
found in custom, nuisance law, restrictive covenants, mistaken
improver, and other doctrines that address some serious
limitations of the exclusion strategy.166 Public governance
principles are primarily derived from land use regulation and
zoning.167 According to Smith, these principles are the exception
rather than the rule, applying only in limited settings as a
remedy or cure for inefficiencies, unfairness, and injustices
resulting from the exclusion strategy.168
The Smith and Merrill definition of the governance
approach underestimates the role of governance as a
management strategy in property. The governance model is
much, much more than a response to the limitations of the
exclusion strategy. In addition to helping to manage the “internal
life of property,” the governance strategy shapes the social
dimensions of property by mediating a variety of complex
relationships and contexts.169 Configurations of property
entitlements may vary according to the social norm important
to a particular property arrangement.170 Norms of cooperation,
for example, guide configurations geared toward family
relationships.171 The Blackstonian exclusion norm shapes market-
oriented packages of property rights,172 and stronger ethical
165 See, e.g., Merrill, Property Strategy, supra note 6, at 2068–69 (explaining
that the exclusion strategy includes an owner’s right to manage property, which is
qualified by governance rules, such as nuisance); Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7,
at 1693–94 (“[P]roperty defines things using an exclusion strategy of ‘keep off’ or ‘don’t
touch’ and then enriches the system of domains of owner control with interfaces using
governance strategies.”); id. at 1704–05 (explaining that exclusion strategies are
necessary to abridge the number of property rules that would be required under a pure
governance strategy); id. at 1726 (describing governance strategies as the interfaces
between modules of property rights managed by exclusion strategies).
166 See, e.g., Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1703 (noting that
covenants, common interest communities, and trusts are governance strategies that
facilitate coordination of owners’ use of property in light of spillovers); Henry E. Smith,
Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 1047–48
(2004) [hereinafter Smith, Exclusion] (explaining that easements have been used to
deal with harms caused by pollution).
167 See, e.g., Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1714 (using zoning as an
example of a public governance tool designed to solve problems arising out of different
uses of neighboring land).
168 See id. at 1704–05.
169 Dagan, supra note 51, at 29.
170 Id. at 29–30.
171 Id. at 34–35 (explaining that a structurally pluralistic property system
promotes cooperative norms by, for example, allowing people to choose to share
homeownership or engage in business together).
172 See id. at 30, 40 (explaining that the Blackstonian exclusion norm is crucial
to individuals’ ability to sell their property free from the claims of third-parties).
Blackstone famously declared property to be “that sole and despotic dominion which one
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norms govern complex trust arrangements separating
management powers from benefit entitlements.173 The governance
strategy allows these different norm-based configurations to
operate in their own spheres.174
The need for the governance strategy thus arises not
only because of the limitations of the exclusionary approach
but also because of other important social values and norms
not reflected in the exclusion model.175 It arises because of the
nature of the resource being used and managed, which affects
the ability of the exclusion strategy to even respond. The
architecture supporting the exclusion strategy is limited by its
reliance on physical boundaries to delineate and define rights.176
Exclusion-based management is most effective with tangible
physical resources easily valued in the marketplace and weakest
with intangible resources or new uses made possible by
technological advances and having uncertain impacts.177 Not
surprisingly, the scope of the exclusion model largely mirrors
values and interests important to the market economy. This
approach overlooks the breadth of the gatekeeping powers that
are delegated through the allocation of property rights178—a
delegation that affects not only the rightholder’s interests in
identified, tangible resources (for example, land) but also in
related intangible resources (such as air) and in associated
resources suddenly made accessible through technological
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the
right of any other individual in the universe.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*2. A strict interpretation of Blackstone’s declaration thus would promote and protect a
strong—almost absolute—right to exclude. See Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note
1, at 856–60 (discussing the strict individual rights or exclusion-based view of property).
173 See Dagan, supra note 51, at 30, 33–34 (explaining that property law is
necessary to ensure that people’s expectations are met when dealing with others who
have the incentive to engage in opportunistic behavior).
174 Cooperation-based norms governing the property of married couples, for
example, have led to rules and standards that differ from those applying to other shared
ownership arrangements. Where recognized, a tenancy by the entirety may shield
property from the creditors of the individual spouses. See Orth, supra note 43, § 33.07(e).
By contrast, the creditors of one spouse can reach property held in joint tenancy with the
other spouse. See id. § 31.07(e).
175 See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 51, at 29 (noting that inclusion is an important
value of property law, as demonstrated in the doctrines of fair use in copyright and fair
housing in landlord-tenant law); Singer, Law of Democracy, supra note 9, at 1321
(explaining that a property owner’s “right to be free from expropriation of his” or her
property “embodies fundamental normative choices about the powers that go along
with ownership in a free and democratic society”).
176 See Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1703–04, 1718 (describing the
modularity of property as establishing boundaries between physical “things”).
177 Cf. Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 15, at 45–51 (discussing
the importance of standardization in a system of property rights).
178 See ELY, supra note 108, at 3 (describing private property rights as
consistent with protection from government power over individuals).
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advances (for instance, shale gas deposits). The allocation of
power also has significant relational implications for those
excluded now and in the future. Because of its breadth, property’s
allocation of power needs to be managed to ensure that its
exercise conforms to the rule of law, is not used coercively, and
does not result in the unconstrained exercise of power.179
One reaction to a more expansive view of the governance
strategy is the argument that the institution of property should
be confined to “what it does best.”180 Some property scholars
have advanced this position in reaction to a call by progressive
property scholars for recognition of a social-obligation norm in
property.181 Such a duty to share would address the inequalities
and injustices resulting from property’s allocation of resources
and, according to some proponents, could even require forced
sharing of surplus wealth through property principles to help
the less fortunate.182 While those property scholars opposing
such a sharing obligation generally recognize distributive justice
as a legitimate goal, they maintain that using our property
system to achieve distributive goals would unnecessarily
complicate the system in undesirable ways.183 In addition to
increasing the information costs of navigating the property world,
a duty to share imposed on wealthy property owners would
violate a principle of equity by treating a subgroup of property
owners differently from other property owners and from other
taxpayers more generally.184 Serious questions of institutional
competence also would arise if common law property decisions
shaped social-insurance policy instead of elected legislators.185
179 See, e.g., JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE ANATOMY OF POWER 13, 53 (1983)
(identifying property as being important to the “exercise of power, the submission of some
to the will of others”); Dagan, supra note 51, at 36–39 (arguing that property’s
heterogeneity is steadfast in its commitment to the rule of law and the constraint of
government power over private property owners).
180 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Affirmative Duties of Property Owners: An
Essay for Tom Merrill, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 43, 69–70 (2014).
181 E.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 748 (2009) (arguing that property promotes the
value of human flourishing through a norm of social obligation); see also Ellickson, supra
note 180, at 62–70 (discussing the Progressive position and ultimately concluding that its
adoption would be a “grave mistake”).
182 See Alexander, supra note 181, at 745–46, 748 (discussing the obligation
to share).
183 See Ellickson, supra note 180, at 61–62, 65–66, 69.
184 See id. at 66–67.
185 See id. at 65–68 (criticizing the social obligation norm based on
“[c]onsiderations of efficiency, horizontal equity, and relative institutional competence”).
Henry Smith adds that imposing a general duty to share on property owners would ask
property law to do too much and would ignore the importance of “specialization of the
parts in achieving the goals of the whole.” Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1719.
What these responses ignore is the practice of using public property or public control to
subsidize residents’ income (as in Alaska) or to provide public services (for example,
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While property law admittedly would become more
complex if a broader approach to the governance strategy were
taken, the narrower exclusion-based approach ignores the
management responsibilities of property. At the very least, the
more limited approach passes the buck to a political branch
that has no political appetite for tackling distributive justice
problems and expanding the social safety net. It also espouses
trickle-down economics as the solution to distributive justice
problems despite the realities of its failure186 and ignores much
of the impact of property use on natural systems. A capitalist
economy depends on the property system to provide for the
lawful conversion of nature’s processes into an exchange value
that the marketplace can understand.187 Once conversion
occurs, capitalism takes over, shaping and reshaping the
resource, as well as natural processes and systems.188
Unless property takes responsibility for the limitations
of the conversion process, the institution of property will
overlook the importance of a broader systems management
approach and undermine its ability to self-regulate. The
exclusion strategy oversimplifies the noneconomic dimensions
of property and directs people along its preferred paths.189
Property’s social dimension thus is effectuated in large part by
property’s in rem nature, affecting third parties generally, and
by the networks supported by property’s exclusion-based
infrastructure. Yet just as natural self-organizing systems have
developed principles to sustain themselves,190 property has
similarly developed features and dialectical processes that
allow the system to evolve and promote resilience.191 The
exclusion strategy ignores many of these features—traits like
education and electricity), often in exchange for lower taxes. For a discussion of
conservative socialism in practice today, see Gar Alperovitz & Thomas M. Hanna,
Socialism, American-Style, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
07/23/opinion/socialism-american-style.html [https://perma.cc/J66D-5WBY].
186 See HA-JOON CHANG, 23 THINGS THEY DON’T TELL YOU ABOUT CAPITALISM
137–47 (2010); Paul Krugman, Inequality Is a Drag, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/08/08/opinion/paul-krugman-inequality-is-a-drag.html [https://perma.cc/V
J7G-QS7J].
187 See DAVID HARVEY, SEVENTEEN CONTRADICTIONS AND THE END OF
CAPITALISM 41–42 (2014).
188 See id. at 246–47.
189 See Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 1, at 885–90 (explaining how
the economic vision of property embeds choices and assumptions in the gatekeeper’s
decision-making framework that direct the gatekeeper along certain normative paths).
190 See generally CAPRA & LUISI, supra note 143, at 362–66 (discussing the
importance of understanding how ecological systems sustain themselves).
191 See Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 1, at 852–53 (explaining that
property is a dynamic concept that adapts through time to fit ever-changing needs).
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interdependence, redundancy, complexity, and feedback loops
that promote resilience.192
An expanded, co-equal governance model of management
would provide a systems view of property that recognizes the
boundaries of “discernible patterns” of connections between
property owners and their resources as secondary to the
relationships and systems in which they are embedded.193 Air
travel, for example, would have faced serious holdout problems
had the exclusion-based view of owning up to the heavens
prevailed. Instead, the courts upheld society’s interest in air
travel by gradually reinterpreting the nature of an owner’s air
rights.194 This transition would have occurred more quickly had
property recognized an expanded governance strategy that was
triggered not only by limitations of the exclusionary approach
but also by the public interest in technological advances
enabling new uses of shared resources (here air travel). A
broader approach to property’s management role would
complement the exclusion strategy not only by addressing its
limitations but also by providing a positive theory of property
as a management institution. This theory would reflect the
fundamental norms and principles of our political and natural
systems to promote the systems’ integrity.
II. A BROADER APPROACH TO PROPERTY’SMANAGEMENT
ROLE
What would a broader approach to property’s management
role involve? When should a court apply a governance approach to
resolve property disputes under the common law? When, if ever,
should a governance approach be the primary management
strategy? This part examines these questions, first, in a discussion
of the limitations of the exclusionary approach and, second, in an
opening dialogue about situations or contexts better handled
192 See id. at 871, 890, 899, 900 (explaining that these are features of human
systems that are incorporated into property to ensure that it can be flexible to the
human condition). Hanoch Dagan might explain the exclusion strategy as failing to
recognize that different configurations of property reflect different norms and values.
See Dagan, supra note 51, at 29–30.
193 See CAPRA& LUISI, supra note 143, at 80.
194 E.g., Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936) (deciding
that a landowner did not have rights to that part of the column of airspace above his
land that he could not use). The Supreme Court adopted this approach in United States
v. Causby, concluding that the navigable airspace above a person’s land generally was
public property unless air travel actually harmed the landowner below. United States
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265–67 (1946). The Court explained that, with the advent of air
travel, the airspace had become a “public highway . . . . Were that not true, every
transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits.” Id. at 261.
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under a governance strategy. This part argues that a broader
governance strategy would take into account limitations of the
exclusion-based approach. It would consider the nature of the
resource to be used, the importance of noneconomic values to
collective interests in the resource, the role of technological
advances in enabling a private use, the importance of public
rights to the resource, and the true scale of private use.
Consideration of these and other factors would help to identify the
types of contexts or problems that could threaten the integrity of
fundamental political, legal, and natural systems.
A. Limitations of an Exclusion-Based Approach to
Management
Although the exclusion strategy works well much of the
time, a number of significant limitations have resulted in flawed
decision making and have caused short- and long-term problems.
Key limitations include: a false, foundational assumption of
unlimited growth; critical omissions from the decision-making
calculus; serious negative externalities resulting from or
aggravated by an exclusion-based approach; overfragmentation of
property rights and resources; significant problems of scale; and
the coupling of common law and constitutional property through
the mainstream economic theory of property.
1. The False Assumption of Unlimited Growth
Because of the interdependence of the exclusion-based
approach to property and a capitalist economy, the limitations
of the exclusion strategy of property management are, in some
significant ways, limitations of capitalism. The goal of most
capitalist economies is perpetual growth.195 Politicians and
economists alike profess the importance of continuing growth of
the Gross Domestic Product through the production and sale of
material goods, and offer growth as a cure for many serious
social problems.196 While this position might not be so
problematic when resources are abundant, it has serious
ramifications for a world of finite resources. According to one
expert, capitalist economies face three significant obstacles to
195 CAPRA& LUISI, supra note 143, at 56.
196 See Krugman, supra note 186; Paul Krugman, Where’s My Trickle?, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 10, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/10/opinion/10krugman.html
[https://perma.cc/V2ZZ-RBQT]; cf. Bruce Bartlett, How Supply-Side Economics Trickled
Down, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/06/opinion/06bartlett.
html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/HK82-RJ93] (explaining how supply-side economics has
become “misleading and meaningless”).
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continuing growth: depletion of fossil fuels and other vital
natural resources; climate change and other serious negative
externalities “arising from the extraction and use of resources”;
and systemic failures in financial and monetary systems that
are highly dependent on growth.197
The worsening problem of climate change and the
systemic failures of our financial and monetary systems, in
particular, have led some experts to call for a redefinition of
growth—one that builds in a qualitative dimension to
complement the quantitative one.198 Their approach does not
deny the importance of growth to living systems, but rather
stresses that growth cannot be viewed as “linear and unlimited.
While certain parts of organisms, or ecosystems, grow, others
decline, releasing and recycling their components.”199
Assumptions about the growth of economic and financial systems
should similarly reflect the nonlinearity of growth in a complex
society. A qualitative approach would define growth as
“enhanc[ing] the quality of life” and leading to “an increase of
complexity, sophistication, and maturity.”200
A systems view of life helps to identify principles that
shape the concept of qualitative growth.201 “[T]he qualities of a
complex system refer to properties of the system that none of
its parts exhibit”—properties like health, stress, and systems
integrity.202 These qualities arise from the “processes and
patterns of relationships among the parts” and thus “cannot be
expressed as the sum of properties of the parts.”203 Quantities
measure properties of the parts (like their mass or energy), and
their sum total measures the corresponding property of the
whole.204 They do not, however, tell us about the stress or
health of the system that results from interactions of the parts or
197 CAPRA& LUISI, supra note 143, at 367.
198 Id. at 368.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Systems-thinking stresses the view of systems as “integrated wholes.” Id.
at 63. Essential properties of a living system are “properties of the whole, which none
of the parts have.” Id. at 65. The essential properties arise from “interactions and
relationships between the parts.” Id. “[P]roperties of the parts are not intrinsic
properties, but can be understood only within the context of the larger whole.” Id. at
66. The parts are “understood only from the organization of the whole.” Id. “Systems
thinking [thus] is ‘contextual’” and reverses the relationship between the whole and its
parts. Id. For application of this thinking to global efforts to address climate change,
see Sarah J. Adams-Schoen et al., A Response to the IPCC Fifth Assessment, 45 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10027, 10035–36 (2015) (interpreting the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report as
taking a systems approach).
202 CAPRA& LUISI, supra note 143, at 368.
203 Id. at 368–69.
204 Id.
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the processes of interaction. They cannot tell us about the
complexity of a system, its networks, or its patterns of
organization.205 To properly assess the health of a system and
adequately define the management role of property, qualitative
indicators of social-ecological systems must play a role.
Quantitative measurements simply do not provide sufficient
information or perspective.
Because of the rights-based focus of the exclusion
strategy, the qualitative aspects of growth and property use are
overlooked under an exclusionary approach to defining
property rights and resolving property disputes. A governance
strategy, with its context-based perspective, would allow
consideration of qualitative indicators of the impacts of
property use on the health of our interdependent systems.
2. Sins of Omission: Those Interests Left Behind
The exclusionary approach focuses on the individual
property owner and grants the owner a monopoly of power over
a particular resource.206 Public interests in common resources
are typically viewed as inferior to private rights—and sometimes
even illegitimate.207 Even when the resources are publicly
owned, lawmakers and private rights advocates often question
the public interests, downplaying the importance of the resources
to the public or questioning the legitimacy of the government’s
ownership.208 Public goods are taken for granted or viewed with
205 Id.
206 See Merrill, Property Strategy, supra note 6, at 2090–91 (recognizing this
weakness).
207 This view of inferiority results, in large part, from the rights-based focus of
the exclusion strategy, which stresses promotion of self-interests and maximization of the
individual owner’s welfare. See Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 1, at 856–63
(discussing the development and dominance of the individual rights vision of property).
208 In recent years, for example, this private rights bias has controlled the
dialogue about much needed transportation improvements, resulting in a preference
for public-private partnerships (PPPs) even when net savings are not evident. Virginia
recently learned that it could save millions in costs and even net $200 to $500 million
in revenues if the state controlled financing and construction of the proposed expansion
of Interstate 66 instead of handing control over to private investors. Michael Laris,
State Control of I-66 Expansion Could Net Virginia Substantial Revenue, WASH. POST
(May 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/state-control-of-
i-66-expansion -could-net-virginia-substantial-revenue/2015/05/18/a3629d58-fd7f-11e4-805c-
c3f407e5a9e9 _story.html [https://perma.cc/6VLD-T7AK]. Another ongoing debate involves
challenges to federal ownership of lands out west and growing calls to sell all public lands
that are not national parks. Martin Heinrich, The Land Grab Out West, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
26, 2014), http://nyti.ms/ZRW5ZV [https://perma.cc/AX97-DFRK] (discussing recent efforts
in western states to have federal lands sold to private parties or transferred to state
governments to manage); Will Rogers, Our Land, Up for Grabs, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/02/opinion/our-land-up-for-grabs.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/TW9L-MAUH] (discussing steps in Congress to buy and sell federal lands).
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suspicion. Though the aggregate value of the public’s interests
may be high, the interests might be too diffused—too spread out
among too many—to get the legal system’s attention. Typical
arguments made to stress the superiority of the private interests
focus on how private ownership could produce so much more
wealth for society than public ownership and management.209
The global climate system provides a poignant example
of how collective interests are being left behind in the interest
of maximizing wealth through private property. Even though
an overwhelming percentage of climate scientists now agree
that climate change can be attributed to humans and is
occurring faster than predicted,210 the United States still lacks
a comprehensive federal approach to climate change.211
Humanity’s primary contribution to climate change is the
generation of greenhouse gas emissions (especially CO2) from
the burning of fossil fuels and land use changes like
209 One of the latest examples involves the movement to privatize air control.
See Susan Carey & Andy Pasztor, Sparks Fly on Privatizing Air-Traffic Control, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sparks-fly-on-privatizing-air-traffic-control-1
408921476 [https://perma.cc/CPM7-548Z]; Andy Pasztor, Rep. Bill Shuster Releases
‘Principles’ for Bill to Privatize U.S. Air-Traffic Control, WALL ST. J. (June 15, 2015), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/rep-bill-shuster-releases-principles-for-bill-to-privatize-u-s-air-traffic-
control-1434398386?mod=rss_Politics_And _Policy [https://perma.cc/5PHY-JF33].
210 See generally WORKING GROUP I, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 4 (2013), http://www.
climatechange2013.org [hereinafter IPCC FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT] (reporting on the
science and impacts of climate change).
211 In his second term, President Obama made climate change a priority, taking
a number of administrative actions to address the problem. Those actions included
adoption of a Climate Action Plan, issuance of executive orders to federal agencies, and
reaching an agreement with China to cut greenhouse gas emissions. See EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (2013), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5VHE-SP5W]; Allie Malloy & Sunlen Serfaty, Obama Unveils Major Climate Change
Proposal, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/02/politics/obama-climate-change-plan/index.
html [https://perma.cc/RSG7-NY7S] (last updated Aug. 3, 2015); Katie Valentine, White
House Announces Plan to Tackle the Health Threats of Climate Change, THINKPROGRESS
(Apr. 7, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/04/07/3643682/white-house-climate-
health-initiatives [https://perma.cc/X6EV-NME9]. More recently, President Obama helped
to lead the effort on the global stage to pass a landmark climate deal that includes
“holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-
industrial levels.” Conference of the Parties, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, art. 2, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/
eng/l09r01.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB3G-UBZX]. Only 10 of 195 nations declined to submit
pledges addressing reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. See Dean Scott, With Paris
Accord in Hand, 195 Countries Look Ahead to Morocco and 2016 Talks, 46 ENV’T REP.
3846, 3846 (2015); Alex Morales, Only 10 Nations Decline to Submit Pledges at Paris
Talks to Reach Climate Agreement, 46 ENV’T REP. 3776, 3776 (2015); Sewell Chan, Key
Points of the Paris Climate Pact, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/projects/cp/climate/2015-paris-climate-talks/key-points-of-the-final-paris-climate-
draft [https://perma.cc/7DND-4Q6K].
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deforestation that release greenhouse gases.212 Some of the
impacts of climate change in the United States include more
extreme weather events (such as heavier rain events, larger
snowstorms, and longer droughts), shifting growing seasons,
warmer temperatures, and sea level rise.213 Despite the
significance of these impacts for the public at large, federal and
many state legislatures have refused to act, denied the problem,
or even prohibited government agencies from taking action.214
Instead, many elected officials have been persuaded to protect
and promote the property interests of powerful oil and gas
companies, which have tremendous reserves of fossil fuel.215 A
business-as-usual mentality grounded in mainstream economics
pervades their lawmaking and policy development. Collective
interests in a sustainable and healthy Earth are relegated to
the back burner.
Approaching climate change through a systems view
would help to break the destructive cycle fueled by the economic
theory of property. The Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) links the
costs of maintaining infrastructure systems for the built
environment with ecosystem services.216 Sustaining the built
environment through a systems view would involve examining
the “relationship between essential services provision and
ecosystem structure and function.”217 As explained in a recent
article on the normative implications of the IPCC’s report, the
current commodity-based approach to property rights in natural
resources focuses on “the market values of goods that can be
212 JOSEPH ROMM, CLIMATE CHANGE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 20–
22 (2016).
213 See IPCC FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 210, at 23–24.
214 Senator Inhofe famously brought a snowball onto the floor to prove the
absence of climate change. Ted Barrett, Inhofe Brings Snowball on Senate Floor as
Evidence Globe Is Not Warming, CNN (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/26/
politics/james-inhofe-snowball-climate-change/index.html [https://perma.cc/CDS3-PXPX].
The republican controlled Congress has refused to take action, while the North Carolina
state legislature prohibited state agencies from using up-to-date flood data and the
Virginia General Assembly insisted on referring to sea level rise as recurrent flooding.
See Alon Harish, New Law in North Carolina Bans Latest Scientific Predictions of Sea-
Level Rise, ABC NEWS (Aug. 2, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/north-carolina-bans-
latest-science-rising-sea-level/story?id=16913782 [https://perma.cc/6GLV-T59F]; Rebecca
Leber, Virginia Lawmaker Says ‘Sea Level Rise’ Is a ‘Left Wing Term,’ Excises It from
State Report on Coastal Flooding, THINKPROGRESS (June 10, 2012), http://thinkprogress.
org/climate/2012/06/10/496982/virginia-lawmaker-says-sea-level-rise-is-a-left-wing-term-
excises-it-from-state-report-on-coastal-flooding [https://perma.cc/C4HE-ZZ3K].
215 See ROMM, supra note 212, at 182–88 (discussing the partisan divide on
climate change existing at the national level and the role of the fossil fuel industry in
spreading misinformation on climate change).
216 See Adams-Schoen et al., supra note 201, at 10035–36 (exploring the
normative implications of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report).
217 Id. at 10036.
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taken from ecosystems, without also accounting for the methods
of sustaining the production of those goods or the loss of
production in the future.”218 This perspective has hastened “the
decline of functionality throughout the natural systems. . . . [and]
limited the ability of ecosystems to regenerate and sustain
themselves.”219 A systems view that considered ecosystem services
would “break from commodity-based valuation” by appreciating
“the manner in which ecosystems produce goods of value, the
manner in which ecosystems provide services that are essential to
human well-being, and the economic value that can be attributed
to functioning ecosystems as the value of the services they
provide.”220 This approach would not omit ecological interests,
but would rather examine how ecosystem structures and
processes provide clean air and water, temperature regulation,
nutrient cycling, flood control, and so much more.221
Another poignant example of the relational interests
being left behind in the pursuit of wealth maximization by
property owners under our current system is the widening
divide between the haves and the have-nots.222 The distribution
spillovers of a property system based primarily on mainstream
economics and reinforced by the exclusion strategy are now
painfully obvious. Under mainstream economics, the
distribution function of property is presumed to occur through
trickle-down economics after property rights are exercised and
greater wealth is generated.223 The benefits of supporting
property owners through less regulation, lower tax rates, and
other free market policies are supposed to be seen in a bigger
pie that in the long run benefits ordinary people: the thinking
is that more wealth earned leads to the creation of more jobs
for lower income people and a larger surplus to be redistributed
through social programs.224 This theory of trickle-down
economics, however, assumes that those made wealthier invest
their new wealth in job-creating activities and that elected
officials have the political will to redistribute wealth.225
Those assumptions have not held up, and instead, the





222 Even advocates of the exclusion strategy recognize the problem of income
inequality as a consequence of our property system that ultimately could undermine
the system. See, e.g., Merrill, Property Strategy, supra note 6, at 2093–94.
223 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
224 See CHANG, supra note 186, at 137–38, 142–47.
225 See id. at 145.
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2012, 99% of earners in the United States had only a 6.6%
growth in real income while the top 1% experienced an 86.1%
growth.226 In 2012 the top 1% averaged over $1.2 million in
earnings with capital gains included, and over $1 million
without.227 The United States now has one of the largest income
gaps found in nations with developed economies and even as
compared to many developing economies.228 According to a 2014
report by the Federal Reserve, the “wealth share of the top 3
percent climbed from 44.8 percent in 1989 to 51.8 percent in 2007
and 54.4 percent in 2013.”229 Further, the “top 0.1 percent are now
worth more than the entire bottom 90 percent of the U.S.
population.”230 If allowed to continue, excessive wealth
accumulation and unconstrained hoarding of resources eventually
will tear the fabric of any stable society. When that society is
based on principles of individual liberty and equality of
opportunity, the threat posed by excessive wealth accumulation to
that society is even more poignant.
A broader governance strategy, with its recognition of
the importance of systems integrity, would allow consideration
of the significant ecological and distributional interests ignored
by the exclusion-based approach to property management.
3. Property’s Negative Externalities
Because the American property system divides resources
into separately owned units, each owner has, as Tom Merrill
explained, “built-in incentive[s]” to ignore the effects of
management decisions on others.231 When these effects or
externalities become too great, Merrill recognizes that another
system for managing resource use may be needed.232 But even
when the legal system internalizes some negative externalities
and brings them home to the decision maker, the system will





229 Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2010 to 2013:
Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL., Sept. 2014, at 10.
230 Joaquim Moreira Salles, The Wealth Gap Between Rich and Poor Is the
Widest Ever Recorded, THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 18, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/
2014/12/18/3605137/us-wealth-gap-at-its-widest-in-decades [https://perma.cc/85LZ-FA7S];
see also Richard Fry & Rakesh Kochhar, America’s Wealth Gap Between Middle-Income
and Upper-Income Families Is Widest on Record, PEWRESEARCHCTR. (Dec. 17, 2014), http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/17/wealth-gap-upper-middle-income [https://perma.
cc/E82H-S5AK].
231 Merrill, Property Strategy, supra note 6, at 2089.
232 Id. at 2090.
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ignore, discount, or fail to recognize other spillovers of property
use. Such situations are especially likely to arise when complex
natural systems are affected over the very long-term (as, for
example, with climate change).233 They also may arise when the
spillovers adversely affect a great number of people, producing
significant harm in the aggregate but relatively minor harm on
an individual basis.234 Or the harm may be too intangible or
difficult to measure quantitatively. The harms predicted to
arise from the proposed Grand Canyon development projects,
for instance, are virtually impossible to measure in dollars and
cents.235 What would be the value of a not-so-grand Grand
Canyon experience if the solemnity of nature’s creation is not
preserved? If the spiritual transcendence of the experience is
marred by cable cars traversing the Canyon walls or by the
lights of an amphitheater and restaurant complex?
Under the mainstream economic theory of property, the
owner generally lacks the incentives to manage for resilience.
Such efforts require an understanding of the drivers that cause
a social-ecological system to cross a threshold to a new regime,
the variables that promote resilience, and the adaptive capacity
of humans.236 A rational acting property owner will eliminate
redundancies and focus narrowly on what is “directly and
immediately beneficial” to the owner.237 The owner will simplify
values and interests affecting the decision-making process,
reducing them “to a few quantifiable and marketable ones.”238
The value of beauty, the grandeur of the Grand Canyon, and the
existence of species will be ignored or, at best, discounted.239
Property owners will unknowingly be guided by options and
233 Climate scientists have concluded that key impacts of climate change “are
irreversible on a time scale of centuries and possibly millennia.” ROMM, supra note 212, at
141. That is, even if humans were to stop all greenhouse gas emissions immediately, the
effects of the increased greenhouse gas concentrations already in the atmosphere still
would be felt for 1000 years. Id. at 143. The key impacts include sea level rise and
reduction in dry-season rainfalls in some of the world’s most productive agricultural
areas. Id. For further discussion of the best- and worst-case scenarios for climate change,
see id. at 131–145.
234 Suppose, for example, that air pollution affected a large, populated area and
that each resident developed mild respiratory problems because of the pollution. The
harm experienced on an individual basis would be relatively minor and probably would
not be high enough to motivate an individual to sue the polluter. The aggregate harm,
however, would be significant.
235 See supra notes 58–94 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed
development projects).
236 BRIAN WALKER & DAVID SALT, RESILIENCE THINKING: SUSTAINING
ECOSYSTEMS AND PEOPLE IN A CHANGING WORLD 59 (2006). For a discussion of some of
those drivers and variables, see Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 1, at 891–99.
237 SeeWALKER& SALT, supra note 236, at 7.
238 See id.
239 See id.
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assumptions embedded in the exclusion-based property system
to make decisions reflecting mainstream economic incentives.240
Political justifications for property rights generally will reinforce
this incentive structure. Under those justifications, strong
exclusion-based rights promote the liberty interests of the
individual property owner; freedom from government and third-
party interference thus intertwine the economic and political
views.241 The result is a decision-making process focused on the
narrow self-interests of the individual property owner and not
generally on noneconomic values or system integrity.
4. The Dangers of Overfragmentation
The gatekeeping powers of a property owner include the
power to disaggregate and alienate portions of his interests in a
spatial, temporal, and conceptual sense. An owner may transfer
just a portion of a tract of land (for example, a subdivided lot),
just a future interest in the title (such as a remainder interest),
or just a particular stick in his bundle of rights (for instance, an
easement). For the most part, these powers to disaggregate and
alienate work well, providing a supply of segmented resources to
meet demand by allowing landowners to tailor specific transfers.
Sometimes, however, these powers lead to overfragmentation of
interests and resources, setting up each new transferee-owner as
an independent actor with the power to veto projects requiring
the assembly of permissions or interests.242 Buttressed by the
exclusion strategy, each new owner has the right to deny a
request to purchase her interests and the incentive to holdout
for an exorbitant price.
In the 1980s Frank Michelman first spoke of such a
regime where no one could use a resource without the permission
of everyone else, calling it an anticommons.243 Michael Heller then
applied the concept in ways that explained perplexing real-life
240 For further discussion of how mainstream economics now dominates
property theory and how it guides decision making, see Butler, Resilience of Property,
supra note 1, at 877–90.
241 See id. at 856–60, 869, 878–81 (discussing Locke, Blackstone, and other
origins of the political exclusionary view of private property).
242 This problem of independence caused by segmentation has even affected
land use and environmental reviews of development projects. See infra note 247 and
accompanying text.
243 Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in 24
NOMOS: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 6, 9 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1982); Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 35, 41 (Kenneth Ayotte &
Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).
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situations.244 The efficiency concern underlying an anticommons
situation is that “a value-enhancing assembly . . . will fail to
occur as a result of strategic holdout behavior and other
transaction costs.”245 Not all anticommons, however, produce
such a result. Only those that involve “settings where good
substitutes are absent” provide the possibility of an “assembly
failure . . . attributable not to efficient fragmentation but to
strategic behavior.”246
The exclusion strategy encourages segmentation not
only among property owners but also among those government
units tasked with the responsibility of reviewing proposed
development projects for environmental harm or conducting
large-scale planning.247 What is missing from the government’s
and the property owner’s decision-making calculus is a view of
the whole—of the larger picture. By the very act of separating
resources into individually owned units, property builds the
owner’s monopoly power into each unit. Further, once started,
the disaggregation process takes on a life of its own. After
natural resources are converted into individual units of
ownership and then into goods or products having an exchange
value, capitalism takes over, shaping and reshaping the
natural processes.248 Property law legitimizes the conversion of
natural resources into items having an exchange value in the
marketplace, and capitalism then drives the demand for more.
Because of the social-ecological dynamic of our property
system, a broader, macro view of property’s management role
needs to be taken. Systems theory reveals that traits or
properties of a system are eventually “destroyed when a system
is dissected, either physically or conceptually, into isolated
elements.”249 Under a systems view, the “boundaries . . . of the
discernible patterns . . . are secondary” to the relationships
formed by connections of the parts.250 Living systems involve a
244 See Heller, supra note 10, at 633–39; Fennell, supra note 243, at 41.
245 Fennell, supra note 243, at 41.
246 Id. at 42.
247 See, e.g., Long Island Pine Barrens Soc’y v. Planning Bd., 606 N.E.2d 1373,
1378 (N.Y. 1992) (denying the need for mandatory review of the cumulative impact of 224
separate development projects in an ecologically sensitive area); Forman v. Trs. of State
Univ. of N.Y., 757 N.Y.S.2d 180, 181–82 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (rejecting a claim of
improper segmentation when projects were not planned together and involved
noncontiguous areas); ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, Property’s Functions and the Right to Develop,
in ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMONGROUND ON THEOWNERSHIP OF LAND 84, 88
(2007). For a discussion of the cooperation problem existing in commons and
anticommons and of possible solutions, see Fennell, supra note 243, at 40–41, 45–46.
248 See HARVEY, supra note 187, at 42–44.
249 CAPRA& LUISI, supra note 143, at 80.
250 Id.
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“nesting [of systems] within larger systems,”251 yet we impose
our social systems, including property, on natural systems
without regard for the complexity of the natural systems or
their interconnectedness. A governance strategy provides an
opportunity to put the property system into the context of the
larger whole.
5. Property’s Problem of Scale
Property’s focus on the individual owner under an
exclusion strategy creates serious problems of scale. In making
decisions, the owner will only consider the costs and benefits
that directly affect him or her and will, as a rational actor,
choose to ignore costs imposed on others or on external
systems. The nature of these costs varies according to the type
of scale. One category is due to the temporal scale of property
decisions—in particular, their impact on future generations.
Though economists attempt to measure at least some of these
costs by discounting future costs to present value, many find this
process problematic.252 In addition to suggesting that future
costs are measurable and that discounting is an adequate way to
measure the impact on future generations, this method does not
bring home the costs to the decision maker unless appropriate
legal action exists and is taken.253
A second type of cost results from the spatial scale of
property decisions. Property use often affects neighboring areas
or resources. Although these costs may be integrated into the
owner’s decision-making calculus to the degree that nuisance
or other legal liability exists, legal concepts and principles limit
the availability of relief. Diffused harm—that is, harm that
may be substantial in the aggregate but not in isolation—is not
likely to be integrated through common law nuisance because
of the substantial harm requirement facing individual
landowners.254 Long-term harm also is not likely to result in
nuisance liability due to problems proving causation over long
251 Id.
252 See Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic
Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1, 40–44 (2001) [hereinafter Kysar, Macro]; Douglas A.
Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 688–91 (2003) [hereinafter
Kysar, Vision].
253 For a discussion of the limitations of mainstream economic analysis of
economic activities and the development of ecological economics, see Kysar, Macro,
supra note 252, at 3–5, 8–17, 28–31; Kysar, Vision, supra note 252, at 678–83, 685–93.
254 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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periods of time.255 A third type of cost arises from the ecological or
natural systems scale of property decisions. Uses conducted by
property owners affect larger natural systems in many ways.
Withdrawing water, producing a waste stream, emitting
pollutants, filling in wetlands, and converting natural resources
to products all have impacts on ecosystems.256 A fourth type of
cost arises from the social scale of property decisions. This scale
includes both horizontal, distributive costs and vertical,
hierarchical consequences.257
Property’s problem of scale emanates from the narrow
definition of scale currently used under the exclusion strategy.
In discussing the structure of property law, Henry Smith
identified one of the “[h]igher-level architectural features” of
property as its scalability.258 He defined scalability as existing
when “features of the whole are inherited from its parts,”
allowing rights and duties to “scale up and down.”259 This
definition focuses primarily on the property owner and on ways
to facilitate the owner’s individual choices, not on the scale of
the impacts of the owner’s decisions—their actual footprint
over time, space, and systems. An owner-centric perspective
fails to ensure consideration of cumulative impact, diffused
harm, or the distributive consequences of owners’ decisions. It
also reveals little sense of temporal scale beyond the owner’s
line of title or of spatial scale beyond the immediate physical
boundaries of the property.
Under such a limited approach, the owner’s management
unit is scaled too narrowly to manage for ecological resilience. By
the very act of separating resources into independent and
individually owned units, property builds in the owner’s individual
sense of scale shaped by exclusionary thinking. This act of
subdivision or severance then enables the owner to convert
nature’s resources and processes into units with an exchange
value, allowing the narrow scale perspective to be perpetuated in
255 For a discussion of some of the mismatch between nuisance liability and
climate change, see David A. Dana, The Mismatch Between Public Nuisance Law and
Global Warming, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 9 (2010).
256 See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ASSESSMENT, OFFICE OF RESEARCH &
DEV., CLIMATE AND LAND-USE CHANGE EFFECTS ON ECOLOGICAL RESOURCES IN THREE
WATERSHEDS: A SYNTHESIS REPORT (2012), https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/global/recor
display.cfm?deid=203462 (follow “Download” tab; then follow “Climate and Land-Use
Change Effects on Ecological Resources in Three Watersheds: A Synthesis Report
(PDF)”) (discussing ecological impacts of land use change).
257 For an exploration of innovative solutions to the problem of inequality, see
ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BEDONE? (2015).
258 Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1712–13 (emphasis omitted).
259 Id. at 1713.
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smaller and smaller units.260 A dispersion of power over
resources occurs, leading to a “diffusion of responsibility” and a
loss of accountability for harm to the larger systems.261 Because
of the mismatch between the scales of a property owner’s
decisions and the scales of the decisions’ impacts, courts,
lawmakers, and regulators need to intervene and adjust the
scales of decision making through the governance strategy and
other management devices.
6. The Coupling Problem
Common law property has an inherent bias for the
exclusion strategy.262 By allocating all gatekeeping powers over
a resource to an individual property owner, the common law
assigns to the owner the right to exclude, the right to use the
property to the exclusion of others, and the power to protect
those rights. When an individual is the sole owner, no other
individual can have the same rights, and the exercise of those
rights binds all others. Through the exclusion strategy, then,
the common law assumes that the decisions of the property
owner generally promote social welfare.
When property owners seek constitutional protection of
their property rights, courts often unintentionally rely on this
bias in their constitutional analyses of the nature and scope of
the rights.263 The assumptions of the exclusion strategy become
embedded in the courts’ basic approach to defining constitutionally
protected property,264 affecting how courts view the impacts of
260 Harvey’s analysis explains why property has a problem of scale: once the
law allows the conversion of nature and its processes from use value to exchange value,
capitalism begins to drive property owners and shape natural processes. See HARVEY,
supra note 187, at 43–44.
261 MARILYN A. BROWN & BENJAMIN K. SOVACOOL, CLIMATE CHANGE AND
GLOBAL ENERGY SECURITY 215–16 (2011).
262 For further discussion of this bias and of the coupling of constitutional and
common law property, see Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 1, at 876–82.
263 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the majority stressed the
importance to the owner of having an economically viable use in concluding that a law
preventing the construction of a “permanent habitable structure” on an ecologically
fragile beach constituted an unconstitutional taking. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1003, 1007, 1016 (1992). Neither the importance of the public
interest in protecting an ecologically sensitive area nor the profits already made by the
landowner in developing other lots in the area mattered to the Court. See id. at 1015–
16, 1028–31; Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 1, at 862. The majority
announced a per se rule for cases involving a total loss of economically viable use,
which meant that the importance of the public interest could not be considered. Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1015–16; see also Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 1, at 862 (discussing
the influence of the individual rights approach to property on the Supreme Court).
264 See Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 1, at 883–90 (discussing how
options are embedded in the legal framework for property—the owner’s decision-
making tree).
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private property use and the legitimacy of government efforts to
induce property owners to internalize their negative externalities.
The public interest in the resources affected by the spillovers is
viewed merely as a public exigency justifying the exercise of the
police powers and not necessarily as a limitation of the private
rights. Under the assumptions and logic of the traditional
exclusion strategy, the adverse impact of the property owner’s
use on common resources generally does not figure into the
constitutional calculus when courts evaluate the economic impact
of the government regulation. This bias was evident, for example,
in Justice Holmes’s dismissal of the public interest in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon.265 Though Justice Holmes conceded that a
public exigency justified the passage of the coal act regulating
the property owners, that public exigency did not figure into his
analysis of the economic impact of the state law on the coal
company under the Takings Clause.266 Such judicial analysis
leaves little, if any, room for the possibility that the public quality
of a resource would affect the choice of management strategy and
the property arrangement.
Even a view that regards exclusion as the essence of
property267 cannot justify ignoring serious externalities and
constitutionalizing property’s problem of scale. While
capitalism probably works better in a democracy that has
strong constitutional protections for property rights, the
intertwining of constitutionally protected property and the
exclusion strategy in a capitalist economy magnifies property’s
problem of scale in serious ways.268 If the governance strategy
were made an equal partner in the management role of
property, such action would help to correct this problem and
would bring neglected social contexts and values to the table.
265 260 U.S. 393, 413–14 (1922). In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the coal
company challenged the passage of the Kohler Act as an unconstitutional confiscation
of its property. Id. at 412. The statute prevented coal companies from mining under
another’s surface land to the point of causing subsidence of the surface. Id. at 412–13.
Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes concluded that the law went too far, confiscating
the coal company’s property right to the remaining coal by preventing the mining of that
coal. Id. at 414–16. Though the public interest was important in determining the basic
legitimacy of the act, it was not part of the Court’s evaluation of the economic impact of
the statute on the coal company’s regulated property. See id. at 413–14.
266 See id.
267 See Merrill, Right to Exclude II, supra note 1, at 2–8; Merrill, Right to
Exclude I, supra note 1, at 740–52.
268 See Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 1, at 882–90 (discussing how
the coupling of constitutional and common law property undermines the resilience of
property).
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B. Neglected Social Contexts and Values
The limitations of the exclusion strategy result in an
incomplete management role for property—one that is defined
primarily in the context of the marketplace and mainstream
economics. A more complete role would require a greater range
of perspective, more accurate consideration of social-ecological
contexts, a better accounting of the costs of property use, and a
more nuanced approach to complex resource settings. A more
complete role would more effectively deal with unaccounted-for
spillovers having significant adverse impacts (such as greenhouse
gas emissions), mismatches of scale that go beyond neighbors (for
instance, loss of system-wide ecological services), and coordination
problems arising because of multiple stakeholders (like those
facing a serious water shortage in a large watershed). A more
complete role also would take a nuanced approach to handling
resources subject to complex management forms (such as the
trust or common interest community), resources subject to
complex sharing arrangements (like navigable waters), and
resources that are intangible and thus hard to touch, control or
bound (such as air).
Setting the governance strategy as the default approach
in certain defined, complex contexts would help meet these
needs. Reliance on the governance strategy to manage interests
in complex settings would not diminish the importance of
private property rights, but rather would provide a more
accurate and complete portrayal of the interests and resources
at stake. The governance strategy would provide a “richer
interface” not just “with other rights” but also with other
values important to the integrity of social-ecological systems.269
Values like the public interest in the health of the global
climate system and in the information commons also would be
part of the discussion. These values generally are neglected
under a privatized approach.270
A management strategy for property rights in
information, for example, needs to recognize the inherent
unboundedness of information. This unboundedness is so
impalpable that it would be difficult and, in many cases,
269 Smith, Law of Things, supra note 7, at 1711 (only recognizing the
importance of a “richer interface with other rights”). For a discussion of how other
perspectives are considered in a dialectical process, see Butler, Resilience of Property,
supra note 1, at 900–08.
270 Joe Singer argues that some norms—access to information, innovation, and
equality—are fundamental to our democracy and to our advancement as a society, and
should be part of the property calculus. See Singer, Law of Democracy, supra note 9, at
1299–1303, 1323–28.
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prohibitively expensive to manage solely with the exclusion
strategy.271 Indeed, reliance on a traditional exclusion strategy
could waste resources and stymie development of valuable
alternatives for delivering information. Consider initial industry
efforts to prevent unlawful copying and downloading of music
CDs and albums through costly litigation against individual
violators and through software that facilitated attacks by
malware on the users’ own computers.272 Because the practice
of unlawful copying had become widespread among consumers
and because most violators were not caught, rationally acting
consumers chose to engage in the practice.273 Eventually, the
industry realized it could repackage the product by selling
digital versions of individual songs, allowing consumers to buy
their preferred songs instead of an entire album.274 This
repackaging reduced the cost of the product to a point where
many consumers were willing to forego unauthorized copying.275
A new way of delivering music was born. Applying a governance
approach to digital music from the beginning of the conflict
would have shifted the focus from enforcement of the right to
exclude to consideration of competing interests in the public
platform being used to transmit digital products—a public good
called the Internet.
A governance strategy also would deal more effectively
than the exclusionary approach with extreme distribution
271 For a theory of a new type of externality associated with intellectual
property and other intangible resources, see Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer,
Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 1 (2013).
272 Sony caused a scandal in 2005 when it developed and installed software on
CDs to manage its digital rights by modifying the operating system of consumers’
computers to prevent copying. Ingrid Marson, Sony Settles ‘Rootkit’ Class Action Lawsuit,
CNET (Dec. 29, 2005), http://news.cnet.com/Sony-settles-rootkit-class-action-lawsuit/2100-
1002_3-6012173.html [https://perma.cc/3C3M-L6BW]. The software was not easy to
uninstall and made the affected computers vulnerable to other malware. See id.
273 See Why Does the RIAA Hate Torrent Sites So Much?, MUSIC BUS.
WORLDWIDE (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/why-does-the-
riaa-hate-torrent-sites-so-much [https://perma.cc/4S4Z-7ZWZ] (describing the scope of
the piracy problem, including serious economic consequences that include a 47% drop
in music sales from 1999 when file sharing began to 2009).
274 Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Evolution of Private and Open
Access Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 77, 94 (2008) (discussing the voluntary
reconfiguration of their assets by copyright holders).
275 Id. According to the Recording Industry Association of America, digital
music piracy remains a serious problem and costs the industry billions of dollars.
Resources & Learning, RIAA, https://www.riaa.com/resources-learning/for-students-
educators/ [https://perma.cc/Y2KY-WXEX]. Revenues from digital sales increased 1000%
from 2004 to 2010 but are not yet making up the difference. Why Does the RIAA Hate
Torrent Sites So Much?, supra note 273. Despite the lower costs, some consumers still
pirate music and have lost large judgments. See Amanda Nguyen, Seriously, Don’t
Illegally Download Music!, JETLaw (July 11, 2013), www.jetlaw.org/2013/07/11/seriously-
dont-illegally-download-music [https://perma.cc/Y2MV-4ATZ].
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problems. Those problems exist when a society has extreme
wealth or extreme poverty. Like the exclusion strategy, the
governance approach would accept the idea that the right to
profit is not unlimited.276 Unlike the exclusion strategy, a
governance approach would give that idea meaning under
property law by considering ways to manage the exercise of
property rights to prevent owners from extracting all of the
value from a resource to the point of its depletion,
overfragmentation, or overcapitalization. Such hoarding of
wealth produces serious negative externalities and leads to
social unrest.277 Profits made by investment brokers on Wall
Street from selling short, for example, provide no tangible
benefits to society at large; no goods are made that people can
buy, and few, if any, jobs are created in the manufacturing or
service industries.278 The governance strategy would be open to
managing property rights based on the nature of the resources
(tangible or intangible), on whether the resource is shared with
many different stakeholders (for example, navigable waters),
and on whether the property right being exercised simply
involves profiting from others’ finance capital by risky behavior
or market manipulation.279
When, then, should a governance approach be used to
manage property rights? What complex settings need a
management approach that has more finesse than the exclusion
strategy?280 Such complex situations exist when assets are held
in a complicated manner, with the gatekeeping powers divided
horizontally over time and with complex laws governing the
276 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25, 136
(1978) (recognizing only a right to a reasonable return).
277 See HARVEY, supra note 187, at 59–60 (discussing the adverse relationship
between the “revolt of the mass of the people in the name of inadequate access to
fundamental use values” to a capitalist economy’s trend toward privatization of almost
everything, even “war-making and . . . government itself”).
278 See id. at 132–33 (noting how financial policies and practices led to the
creation of financial markets that lacked transparency and to excessive profits in times
of market collapse); id. at 172–73 (explaining how, during recessions, capital surplus
was more likely to be invested in the stock market, asset purchases, or unstable
financial instruments than in production activities involving job creation); id. at 239–
41 (discussing the creation of “fictitious capital” involving “investments in mortgages,
public debt, urban and national infrastructures” that produced significant short-term
gains even when the investments went bad over the long-term); see also Joseph
William Singer, Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, or Subprime Mortgage
Conundrums and How to Fix Them, 46 CONN. L. REV. 497 (2013) [hereinafter Singer,
Subprime Mortgage Conundrums] (discussing how investments that profited from the
financial capital of others by market manipulation and creation of risky financial
instruments led to significant gains for the investors and huge losses for many others).
279 For a discussion of the challenges of the subprime mortgage crisis for property
law, see Singer, Subprime Mortgage Conundrums, supra note 278, at 512–22, 529–31.
280 For an introduction to these governance situations, see Butler, Governance
Function, supra note 1, at 1757–67.
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relationships (as in some large-scale commercial developments
involving multiple parties and leasehold arrangements). They
exist when gatekeeping powers are divided vertically among
multiple owners (such as with concurrent estates), among
parties with different responsibilities, risks, and interests (like
in a trust), or among highly interdependent stakeholders (for
example, in a common interest community). Or the situation
could involve a resource subject to a complex sharing
arrangement, with both private and public rights at stake. If the
public rights are exercised by the unorganized public, the public
would tend to lose to private owners under a straightforward
exclusionary approach without active government management
and affirmative judicial recognition of the public’s rights.281 In
some states, for example, the public has had difficulty protecting
its longstanding use of beaches against the efforts of private
waterfront owners to close off access.282 Though protection of
public rights in tidelands varies among the coastal states, many
favor private waterfront landowners in disputes with the
public—especially when the source of the public rights is found
in old common law traditions.283 A complex situation also exists
when congestion caused by the unorganized public or changing
natural conditions are affecting use of public goods or
resources, requiring active government intervention.
A governance management strategy would be more
effective than an exclusionary approach in many of these
situations because they raise serious limitations to the
exclusionary approach or involve other important societal values.
In some of the identified situations, the legal system has already
recognized the problem and responded over time with a more
complex management approach. When, for example, a large-scale
281 See Rose, supra note 28, at 750–55 (recognizing some resources, like
navigable waters, as inherently public property because of increasing returns to scale
from the exercise of public rights).
282 See Andrew W. Kahrl, The People’s Beach, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/05/opinion/beaches-belong-to-the-public.html [https://
perma.cc/RQK2-NFCN] (discussing the problem of privatizing beaches). The Texas
Supreme Court, for example, has limited public beach rights in a series of cases. See
Harvey Rice, Texas Court Hits Open Beaches Law, HOUS. CHRON. (Apr. 2, 2017), http://
www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Texas-Court-hits-open-beaches-law-
4223948.php [https://perma.cc/N3KB-HWUQ]; Forrest Wilder, Beach Bummer: The Texas
Supreme Court Guts the Open Beaches Act, TEX. OBSERVER (Mar. 30, 2012), https://
www.texasobserver.org/beach-bummer-the-texas-supreme-court-guts-the-open-beaches-
act [https://perma.cc/9ZUV-P6K3].
283 Compare Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365–66
(N.J. 1984) (recognizing public access to dry sand areas of a beach under the public
trust doctrine), and State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 677–78 (Or. 1969)
(recognizing public rights based on custom), with State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 594 P.2d
1093, 1094 (Idaho 1979) (rejecting efforts to declare beaches public property).
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commercial development project raises significant land assembly
problems because of the project’s scope, a partnership with a
government entity may allow the use of the eminent domain
power284 or a locality’s zoning laws to reduce other development
costs and entice economic development.285 At one point, the courts
also had to address the management problem confronted by
property arrangements involving interdependent property owners
in a common interest community.286 The courts overcame serious
free-rider concerns by recognizing the power of property owners’
associations to enforce the restrictive covenants even when the
association did not own property benefited or burdened by the
covenants.287 Had the courts not intervened and examined more
closely the interests implicated by the property arrangement,
the free-rider concerns would have posed significant economic
disincentives to enforcement of restrictive covenants. Not many
lot owners would have been willing to bear the enforcement
costs for all of the other lot owners in the subdivision.
Situations involving resources shared by the unorganized
public and private property owners are more complicated, from a
property perspective, because of the nature of the resource and
the number of parties involved. Navigable waters and their
submerged beds, for example, are subject to a public navigational
servitude that the Supreme Court recognized because of the
important link between navigation and commerce.288 The waters
are also subject to the rights of private waterfront landowners.289
284 Under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, private property may
only be taken for “public use” with the payment of just compensation. U.S. CONST.
amend. V. Under the United States Constitution, the exercise of the eminent domain
power would have to satisfy the fairly lenient public use standard set forth by the
Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 469 (2005). After Kelo,
many states passed statutory or constitutional amendments imposing a higher
standard for public use under their state law. See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash:
Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2120 (2009) (discussing
the states’ responses).
285 See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 4.10 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing the
use of enterprise zones and tax incentives to encourage land redevelopment).
286 Courts questioned whether homeowner associations had standing to
enforce restrictive covenants when the association did not own any land that was
benefitted by the covenants. SINGER, PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 6.2, at 253.
287 See, e.g., Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15
N.E.2d 793, 795 (N.Y. 1938). State legislatures have since passed property owners’
association statutes governing some management issues raised by this new type of
interdependent property arrangement. See generally SINGER, PROPERTY, supra note 4,
§ 8.5 (discussing common interest communities).
288 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195–97 (1824); see also Butler,
Governance Function, supra note 1, at 1728 & n.240 (discussing the nature of the public
and private rights in navigable waters).
289 See TARLOCK, supra note 93, § 3:74 (discussing the rights of private waterfront
landowners).
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Under the exclusion-based approach, the landowners would have
every incentive to control use of the watercourse as it flowed by
their waterfront land despite the general existence of public
rights under federal law. If such a management approach were
allowed, everyone else would have to pay for passage through
the waters in front of each waterfront landowner’s property.
This toll or use fee approach would impose a huge assembly
problem on others, who would need to gather permission from
all waterfront landowners along their routes. In addition to
discouraging use, the toll approach would fail to capture the
increasing returns to scale that now occur with use by the
unorganized public. As Carol Rose explained, the more people
who engage in recreational or commercial activities on navigable
waters, the more value created.290 At times, the number of users
may lead to congestion, requiring more active management.
But even then, the positive externalities of increasing public
use should outweigh the costs of managing congestion of an
intangible but valuable shared resource.291
The complexity may also arise from a new use made
possible by technological advances raising public health or safety
concerns or serious transaction cost problems. The invention of
the plane, for instance, raised questions about whether the ad
coelum doctrine would be interpreted to prevent passage over
privately owned land without the landowner’s consent.292 Under
the traditional, exclusion-based version of the doctrine, a
landowner owns up to the heavens and down to the depths of the
earth, allowing him to prevent invasions of his column of
airspace.293 Application of the traditional approach thus would
require airlines to acquire or purchase countless rights of
passage, creating the possibility of serious holdout problems. A
governance approach, in contrast, recognizes the atmosphere as
a complex shared resource subject not only to private interests
but also to important public interests like air travel and clean
290 See Rose, supra note 28, at 750–55 (arguing that some resources, like
navigable waters, should be recognized as inherently public property because of the
increasing returns to scale of public use).
291 See Yochai Benkler, Commons and Growth: The Essential Role of Open
Commons in Market Economies, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499, 1501, 1533–1547 (2013)
(reviewing BRETT M. FRISCHMAAN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED
RESOURCES (2012)) (expanding on an argument about the role of open commons by
explaining why open commons are important in complex societies when critical resources
are involved). For further explanation of why the governance strategy would more
effectively manage the complex property sharing arrangement in navigable waters and
their submerged beds, see Butler, Governance Function, supra note 1, at 1729–30.
292 See Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 757–59 (9th Cir. 1936)
(discussing the doctrine’s meaning in light of the technological advances in air travel).
293 See id.
2017] PROPERTY AS A MANAGEMENT INSTITUTION 1271
air. Early cases deciding the question of overflights struggled to
reevaluate the traditional doctrine in light of technological
advances, ultimately developing a modified version that
interpreted landowner rights as existing only in airspace
actually occupied or capable of being used.294 Recognizing the
governance approach as the default management strategy for
this complex situation would have provided a cleaner analysis
that did not need to justify a departure from precedent. A
similar situation arose when the broadcasting industry first
developed, and courts faced new types of conflicts involving use
of the airways.295 One court chose, for example, to recognize a
right to broadcast over a wavelength without material
interference based on priority in time even though no private
rights in airwaves formally existed under the common law.296 A
more robust governance strategy would allow more active
government intervention when intangible shared resources are
subject to private innovation.
New complexities also involve advancements in the
extraction of oil and gas from shale deposits now being used
without the consent of some surface landowners by companies
holding oil and gas leases under traditional laws. These laws
allow companies to force fracking on an unwilling surface
landowner concerned about possible health consequences,
environmental impacts, and other side effects of fracking
operations.297 Under a governance approach, a court would
evaluate whether the companies’ exercise of their property
rights adequately accounts for the impact on the public health
and safety, on the public infrastructure, and on the environment.298
294 See, e.g., id. at 758 (deciding that a landowner did not have rights to the
column of airspace above his land that he could not use).
295 See Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broad. Station, Inc. (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1926),
reprinted in 68 CONG. REC. 215, 215–19 (1926).
296 After noting the failure of Congress to regulate broadcasting, the court in
Tribune recognized that chaos would result if it did not protect the first-in-time broadcasting
station with the established programming and listeners from interference by a newcomer.
The new broadcasting station had ignored generally accepted industry customs and
broadcast over a wavelength very close to the established station’s, making it difficult for
listeners to hear the established station’s broadcasts. The court concluded that priority in
time created a right in the established station to broadcast over the wavelength it had been
using without material interference. Id.
297 See Larry S. Eubanks & Michael J. Mueller, An Economic Analysis of
Oklahoma’s Oil and Gas Forced Pooling Law, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 469, 469 (1986)
(describing and analyzing Oklahoma’s forced pooling laws); Marie C. Baca, Forced Pooling:
When Landowners Can’t Say No to Drilling, PROPUBLICA (May 18, 2011), https://www.pro
publica.org/article/forced-pooling-when-landowners-cant-say-no-to-drilling [https://perma.cc/
5L2K-V922] (discussing the contentious issues raised by forced pooling).
298 Fracking requires tons of water hauled in by heavy trucks and proper
disposal of toxic wastewater. Environmental concerns include water contamination, air
pollution, and a possible increase in earthquakes. For discussions of serious issues
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Complex property settings also might involve private property that
is affected with a public interest due to the essential nature of the
services provided by the property or to a public emergency or
crisis.299 Climate change presents the ultimate example of how
our traditional property system disperses power over resources in
ways that diffuse responsibility and diminish accountability—to
the detriment of all. A multidimensional approach to scale is
needed to impose responsibility on individual property owners,
as well as global, national, state, and local actors.300
Simplistic rules focused primarily on private property
rights do not work as well in complex settings. In such settings,
the governance strategy would allow courts to better perform
property’s management role by considering the relational
dimension of property rights and imposing limits that better
reflect the scale of use. In these situations, the exclusion strategy
generally is incapable of dealing with complex property holding
arrangements, interdependent stakeholders, the mixing of public
and private rights in shared resources, or intangible resources. In
these situations at least—where cross-scale interactions are
occurring—a broader, systemic view is needed to enhance the
responsibility of property owners. Though the governance strategy
is context-dependent and thus vaguer than the exclusionary
approach, its vagueness and flexibility are due to the nature of
the resources and the property arrangement being managed, and
not to a particular rightholder. The governance strategy, in other
words, would manage the exercise of property rights in ways that
ensure greater accountability for the owners’ decisions when
important social contexts and values are being ignored.
CONCLUSION
The institution of property involves a continuum of
possible property arrangements over resources, varying from an
individual rights arrangement to shared resources to
government ownership. The dominant, exclusion-based model of
property focuses primarily on private property rights, limiting
the management function of property to the gatekeeping powers
raised by fracking, see John Wihbey, Pros and Cons of Fracking: 5 Key Issues, YALE
CLIMATE CONNECTIONS (May 5, 2015), http://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2015/05/
pros-and-cons-of-fracking-5-key-issues [https://perma.cc/ZE6Z-ZMZK].
299 For a provocative argument in favor of a common law duty of equal services
owed by owners of property affected with a public character, see CHARLES M. HAAR &
DANIEL WM. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS 18–19 (1986). For further
discussion of the public necessity or crisis setting, see Butler, Governance Function, supra
note 1, at 1741–57.
300 BROWN& SOVACOOL, supra note 261, at 215–39.
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of the individual owner with occasional adjustments made
through the governance strategy. The rational actor assumptions
of the exclusion-based approach shape the choices of the
gatekeeper owners to pursue their own self-interests. As
discoveries and technological advances have enabled the private
use of nontraditional and intangible assets, the limitations of the
exclusion-based strategy have become more serious. Perhaps
because of the new or intangible nature of the assets, the
discoveries and advances have not produced a better
understanding of the serious impacts on the environment and on
others. Also, the owner-centric focus of the exclusionary approach
has so effectively embedded its assumptions of the rational actor
into the architecture of property, including constitutional
property, that it has become very difficult to expand property’s
management function.
The limited, owner-centric approach of the dominant
model is not sufficient, given growing environmental and wealth
inequality problems. That approach does not manage the use of
private property rights in ways that hold the property owners
accountable for the serious negative externalities of their uses.
Nor does it account for other values fundamental to the integrity
of political, economic, and natural systems. Our property system
already has a governance strategy in place that can look beyond
the owner-thing relation. That strategy needs to be broadened to
serve as the default management strategy for certain complex
situations involving private property’s relation to the world
outside the property module. The broader governance strategy
should kick in when the exclusion-based approach is inherently
unable to handle serious environmental problems like climate
change or threatening societal problems like extreme wealth or
extreme poverty. Because of its owner-centric focus, the
individual rights approach cannot, on its own, overcome the
threats to collective interests. Unless a broader management
strategy is adopted in the United States, the exclusion-based
approach will continue to lead the country along a path of
environmental disaster and destruction of its democracy. What
good is zealous protection of individual property rights if the
fabric of a society or the world is ultimately destroyed?
The American property system needs a broader
management approach, with an outward-regarding focus, to
avoid being defeated by its own adverse impacts on natural and
socioeconomic systems. A broader approach would promote the
integrity of core systems, along with the rights of property
owners, by considering the full scales of use and making
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adjustments through democratic institutions. The courts should
play a vital role in making these adjustments as the key political
entity that promotes the rule of law. Even if majoritarian
influences perversely affect another branch of government, the
courts have an independent role to play not only in protecting
individual rights but also in promoting core democratic values.
A more comprehensive governance strategy would not
displace the exclusion-based approach but rather complement and
check it. In certain complex situations, a broader governance
approach would be more effective than the exclusion strategy
because of the broader governance strategy’s focus on the context,
not just on the rights of the individual property owner. Those
complex situations could include complicated property holding
arrangements, a large number of interdependent property
owners, the mixing of public and private rights in shared resources,
new uses of tangible resources made possible by technological
advances with implications for others, and intangible resources.
What must not happen is the continued application of the
exclusion-based approach to these complex situations without
consideration given to the interests left behind or the relations
neglected by the dominant, owner-centric approach.
